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ABSTRACT 
 
Abdirahman Mohamed Gutale M.A. International Studies 
Department of International Studies, May 2008 
University of Kansas 
 
Somalia has been in conflict since January 1991. The approach to explaining 
the conflict has generally followed the Hobbesian and Schmittian dichotomy with 
little discussion of institutional failure as a contributing factor. I argue the conflict in 
South Central Somalia is not among clans. There are three key factors explaining the 
protraction of South Central conflict. First, the power-sharing model that has been 
applied in Somali reconciliation conferences since 1991 assumes that the conflict is 
among clans who are unitary actors; thus, giving all major clans a stake in “an-all-
inclusive” transitional governments is thought to be the solution to the conflict. 
Power-sharing agreements, however, have intensified intraclan struggle for power. 
Second, the losers of power-sharing agreements have formed alliances of 
convenience that transcend clans to undermine reconciliation conferences or 
transitional government that is formed. Third, traditional leaders and informal rules 
have not been a factor in the success of Somaliland and Puntland, the two most stable 
regions in Somalia. Rather, their success was the result of the emergence of a 
dominant group that completed the “state-making” process (Tilly 1980). Hence, I 
argue, the dominant group model is a better alternative to the power-sharing model to 
explain stability (Puntland and Somaliland) and persistent conflict (South Central 
Somalia). 
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CHAPTER I 
DIAGNOSING PROTRACTED CONFLICT IN SOUTH CENTRAL 
SOMALIA 
INTRODUCTION 
Map: Three regions Somaliland (red), Puntland (pink), and South Central Somalia 
(purple) 
 
Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/images/somalia-puntland3.gif 
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The central question of this thesis is: why have South Central conflicts within 
Somalia been protracted?
 1
 Protracted conflicts are bloody, encompass a number of 
armed factions, lack cohesive organizations, and generate mistrust and resistance to 
negotiations (Crighton and MacIver 1991). Somalia has been without a functioning 
government since January 1991.
 
After a complete state collapse, anarchy, and a 
security vacuum that internally displaced approximately 1,000,000 people within 
Somalia and forced over 600,000 others to flee to neighboring or far distant countries, 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed in 2004.
2
 The last government 
Census on Somalia was conducted in 1975; the Somali population was estimated 
between 7-8 million. 
In 2007, three years after the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) came to 
power, close to 7,000 people died in the Mogadishu conflict between the TFG and its 
Ethiopian allies on one side, and an amalgamation of opposition groups on the other 
side.  The fighting between government and opposition wrecked havoc in Mogadishu, 
which experienced the worst fighting in 17 years. Human Rights Watch estimates that 
the conflicts in Mogadishu have displaced nearly 400,000 (in addition to those who 
were already displaced) people between February and May 2007 (“Shell-Shocked: 
Civilians under Siege in Mogadishu” 2007). TFG is weak and lacks legitimacy from 
                                                          
1
 South Central Somalia is the largest of the three regions and the only one with constant anarchy since 
 the collapse of Somali state in January 1991. For discussion on the selection and description 
 of the region, see methodology section.  
 
2
 International, Refugee. Somalia: Country Information Refugee International, March 2008: [cited  
April 9 2008]. Available from 
 http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/country/detail/2890/. 
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the population it claims to represent, and the TFG has faced opposition from political 
entrepreneurs – I use this term rather than commonly used warlord because political 
entrepreneurs include former politicians, former military, warlords, business-lords, 
and religious-lords, and pseudo-traditional leaders – who feel that they did not get 
high enough positions in the transitional administrations. Since the collapse of the 
military regime in 1991, political entrepreneurs in South Central Somalia have 
attempted to create a “vampire state”, to borrow Dr. George B. N. Ayittey‟s phrase, to 
enrich those who are in power.
3
 Like previous transitional governments (there were 
two others since 1991, see page 12), the political entrepreneurs who failed to capture 
a position of power in the TFG have formed alliances of convenience to topple it. We 
will come back to the final chapter. 
The control of access and opportunity used for personal gain to the detriment 
of general welfare is what “rent-seeking”, which William Baumol (2008) calls the 
sixth entrepreneurial activity, is all about. Rent-seeking creates an incentive system 
that reduces the efficiency of the private sector and overall welfare, while transferring 
income to those are successfully rent seekers from the rest of society.  The quest to 
influence the composition of transitional governments since the collapse of the 
military regime and to capture the highest posts (Presidency, Prime Minister, and 
Speaker of the Parliament) has been indicative of the length that political 
                                                          
3
 See Ayittey, George B N. "The African Development Conundrum." In Making Poor Nations Rich: 
 Enntrepreneurship and the Process of Economic Development, edited by Benjamin Powell, 
137-88. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008. 
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entrepreneurs will go to obtain rents. This competition over rents has kept Somalia in 
a “conflict trap”.  
Collier et. al., (2003, 53) define the conflict trap as the “forces generated once 
violence has started and that tend to perpetuate it.” After internal conflict begins in a 
country, the “perpetuating forces” prolong it. The average civil war duration, Collier 
et. al., (2003) report, is around seven years. Even when peace is achieved, it is often 
ephemeral. A post-conflict country “…faces around a 44 percent risk of returning to 
conflict within five years” (Collier et al., 2003, 83) because war intensifies group 
hatred and contributes to the risk of returning to war. The breakdown of peace-time 
social values and atrocities committed during the war further polarize groups; in the 
Somali case the polarization has led to the disintegration of clans in to sub-sub-sub 
clans. The mistrust among warring parties contributes to conflict protraction.  
Barbara Walters (1997) explains the genesis of this mistrust by the fact that a 
country cannot have two (or more) standing armies. There are two perpetuating forces 
that sustain Somali‟s conflict trap. The first one is power-sharing and the second is 
alliances of convenience; while the former is exogenous, the latter is indigenous.  
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Figure 1 – the power-sharing versus the dominant group model  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: By author 
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The power sharing model is exogenous in the sense that it is international and 
regional actors‟ who have attempted to form power-sharing transitional governments. 
The idea of power-sharing is giving all the major actors a stake in future government, 
so they have interest in supporting the peace process because when all parties have 
something to loose in spoiling the peace, they are more likely to abide by the 
agreements. In Somalia, a 4/5 power-sharing formula has been adopted.
4
 The quest 
for an-all-inclusive government has, thus far, eluded international and regional actors 
as is evidenced by the failure of thirteen reconciliation conference, and the persistent 
lack of a functioning government.  
The endogenous element is the formation and reformation of alliances of 
convenience, which political entrepreneurs utilize, not to share power, but to 
undermine power-sharing agreements. The alternative is the emergence of a dominant 
group. I argue that the emergence of a dominant group is more conducive to ending 
the conflict trap than the power-sharing model. Richard K Betts (2005) argues wars 
do not occur by accident but rather wars are mechanisms to decide “who rules” 
present or future governments. Only a dominant group can complete the processes of 
“state-making”, to borrow Charles Tilly‟s (1980) term, by neutralizing or eliminating 
their opponents. Although I don‟t develop the dominant group model (DGM) in this 
                                                          
4
 To create inclusive government, the Somali government in the 1960s adopted a 4/5 power sharing 
 model where the four largest clan families each receives 60 seats in the parliament while 
minority clans called the “others” share the remaining 30 seats. This model was also used in 
the last two Somali national reconciliation conferences: Arte (2000) and Mbghati (2002-
2004). The model, however, has not reduced the fear and insecurity of individual actors from 
some clan families who continue to compete at KP5, KP4, and KP3. 
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thesis, I lay out the grounds for it by showing that evidence from Somalia illustrates 
that the power-sharing model has failed to end protracted conflict in South Central 
Somalia.    
I argue that macro-level (national conflict among clans) accounts and 
assumptions of conflict among clans directed from a unified center overlook 
“interactions between various central and local actors with distinct identities, 
motivations, and interests” (2003, 476). I adopt Stathis N. Kalyvas‟s, a political 
science professor at Yale University, alliance framework because it “allows for 
multiple rather than unitary actors, agency located in both center and periphery rather 
than only in either one, and a variety of preferences and identities as opposed to a 
common and overarching one” (2003, 486, italics in the original). The alliance model 
forms the theoretical underpinning for my argument that the macro-level (national 
conflict among clans) approach misdiagnoses the protraction of conflict in South 
Central Somalia. The alliance framework illustrates that identity is not static based 
primordial cleavage (clan).   
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Figure 2 – KP: Kingship Pyramid 
 
 
Source: Mohamed 1997, adapted by author  
 
Contrary to the assumed unitary actors united under a clan banner, we observe 
imperfect solidarity within subclans as a result of tension between individual and 
collective interests.
 5
 I use Somali society‟s kinship pyramid to show a relationship 
hierarchy based on ancestors.
6
 The pyramid reveals fluid relationships within and 
                                                          
5 For further discussion on the role of in-group solidarity or lack thereof in precipitating conflicts see 
Gould, R. V. (1999). Collective Violence and Group Solidarity: Evidence from a Feuding 
Society. American Sociological Review, 64, 356-380. 
6
 The Somali kinship system is based on two foundations: (i) Xigaalo (common ancestors) and (ii) 
Xidid (marriage alliances). While the former is vertical and is based on perceived blood 
relations, the latter is horizontal. The following pyramid was derived from Mohamed Abdi 
Mohamed‟s “Somalia: Kinship and Relationship Derived from it” in Mending Rips in the Sky: 
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among the hierarchy, but more importantly, it illustrates that clan is but one of the 
seven hierarchy-levels that make up the Somali people. Although group loyalty to kin 
is thought to be at the top of the pyramid, that has not been the case. Contrary to 
Fearon and Laitin‟s (1996) proposition, intra-group cooperation has not been more 
common than inter-group cooperation in Somalia. In fact, I argue that conflict has 
been most intense in the middle of the pyramid KP4 and KP5 (subclan and clan) 
while most often it is generally argued that the Somali conflict has been fought at 
KP6 (clan families).   
I take a micro-level (regional) approach that disaggregates the conflict in 
South Central Somalia, and focuses on identities, actions, and interests of actors in the 
conflicts. Changing the unit of analysis allows us to understand the alliances of 
convenience, which is at the core of the conflict protraction in South Central Somalia, 
and this change has implications for solving the conflict, as it illustrates the failure of 
the power-sharing model.  
The thesis proceeds as follows: in chapter one I provide background on the 
1991 collapse of the Somali state, evaluate theoretical explanations for civil wars and 
critique their application to the Somali conflict, and outline the research design. In 
chapter two, I test the three hypotheses I propose in the research design and 
demonstrate that findings falsify H1 (Credibility) and H2 (Informal rules). In the final 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Options for Somali Communities in the 21
st
 Century, edited by Hussein M. Adam & Richard 
Ford. Canada. The Red Sea Press, Inc. 1997: 145-59. 
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chapter, I illustrate how the alliance framework aptly explains the conflict in South 
Central Somalia more accurately than either Hobbesian or Schmittian explanations.  
BACKGROUND 
The history of Somalia has periods of both dominant groups and power-
sharing. In pre-colonial times, Somalis lived in independent groups. Each subclan 
lived in a known geographical area, although no marked borders existed. Abdi Kusow 
(1994) observes that “Somali nomads never came under the control of a single 
political authority” (38). Ali K. Galaydh (1990) agrees with Kusow that pre-colonial 
Somalia was not conducive to state formation. Although geographically separated and 
lacking a shared administration, Somali nomads have interacted through marriage, 
shared pasture and water, and traded with each other and with coastal dwellers 
(Cassanelli 1982). Pre-colonial South Central Somalia experienced periods of 
dominant groups like the Ajuuraan, Geledi, and Abgal, all subclans ,to mention but 
three (Cassanelli 1982). 
During the formal colonial era (1880s – 1960), Somalia was divided among 
three powers: Italy in the south, the United Kingdom in the north and in the Northern 
Frontier District (NFD) of what became part of Kenya, and France, in present-day 
Djibouti. Many Somalis were also under the control of the Ethiopian empire who with 
tacit approval of the British annexed the Ogaden region in late 1950 (Fitzgibbon 
1982). Colonial control was limited, however, to the major urban centers; the 
nomadic groups continued on much as before in most areas of present-day Somalia. 
11 
 
Although different colonial powers acted differently, for the most part, they
  
did not 
attempt to centralize power in a colonial administration, adopting instead a “divide 
and rule” tactic. To run this urban centered administration, colonialists created a new 
elite class who challenged the power and status of traditional leadership. As more 
aspiring actors sought positions in the colonial administrations, clan was introduced 
as a means to secure favors with colonial powers. The challenge to traditional 
leadership, political competition, and use of clan undermined xeer (informal rules or 
unwritten traditional norms that ordered social interactions). The colonial era was a 
dominant group period although limited to urban areas.  
After World War II, the United Nations established a Trusteeship Authority 
tasked to build a foundation for a future Somali state; Italy administrated the 
Trusteeship. In its ten year mandate; the Italian administrators did not build 
institutional capacity and the human capital necessary for a modern state. The Somali 
Parliament, for example, was filled with illiterate members recruited on a kinship 
basis. Many parliamentarians could not sign their names on the registrar. Training 
civil servants was no more successful (Omar 1993). Somali leaders attached little or 
no premium to state building; rather, they placed a unique premium on rent-seeking. 
Institution building was of no concern to Somali leader; their aim was pilfering state 
coffers, i.e., extracting resources from the general public via the state (Terrence and 
Samatar 1995). The Trusteeship was the first power-sharing period, it was supposedly 
an-all-inclusive administration, ushering in the era of unruly political competition. 
12 
 
Figure 3 – Timeline for Pre-Conflict Somali Governments and Post-Conflict 
Transitional Governments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1961  1967  1960  1991 1995 1996  2000    2004 
Source: Author 
Somalia gained its independence on July 1, 1960.
 7
  Initially, the Somali 
people enjoyed a transitory peace under a fragile democracy. The 1967 presidential 
election was fraught with corruption and fraud, and development money was diverted 
to fund campaigns to buy votes for parliamentarians who were fighting tooth and nail 
                                                          
7
 Somalia has had three pre-conflict governments: (i) Aden Abdulla Osman, the first President of the 
Somali Republic (1961-67); (ii) Abdirashid Ali Sharmake,  the second President of the Somali 
Republic (1967-1969); and (iii) General Mohamed Siad Bare, the third President of Somali 
“Democratic” Republic (1969-1991). Since the collapse of Bare‟s regime, Somalia has had 
three transitional governments formed under national reconciliation conferences: (i) Ali 
Mahdi Mohamed, the President of the first interim government (1991-1995); (ii) Abdiqasim 
Salad Hassan, the President of the Transitional Federal Government (2000-2004); and (iii) 
Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed, the President of the Transitional Federal Government (2004-
Present).  General Mohamed Farah Aidid formed a government of what he called the grand 
coalition in Mogadishu and his supporters declared him President (1995-1996).  After his 
death, his son, Hussein Mohamed Farah Aidid, succeeded him (1995-1997). After the 1997 
Cairo conference where about 25 factional leaders (claiming to represent their clans though 
many were from same clans) met, there was no claim of presidency by any of the major 
factional leaders. While Mahdi, Salad, and Yusuf‟s government enjoyed some international 
and regional recognition, Aidid‟s government lacked both. Madi, Abdiqasim, and Yusuf were 
supported by Djibouti and Italy, Djibouti and several Arab states, and Ethiopia, respectively. 
Refer to figure 3 above.  
 
Osman  
Mahdi  
TFG 
Rashid  
Bare 
TNG M. Aidid 
H. Aidid 
13 
 
to cling to seats because of perks – villas, cars, and a luxurious life style. 8   President 
Sharmake, who won the fraudulent 1967 elections, was assassinated on October 15, 
1969.
9
  A bloodless coup followed the assassination. A military junta led by 
Mohamed Siad Bare, who declared himself President, ruled the country for the next 
twenty-one years. The nine years of post-independence until Bare was when power-
sharing was formalized by introducing the 4.5 formula. 
After taking power, Bare arrested most of the major politicians whom he 
deemed a threat to his power, and he executed some of his coup allies like General 
Salad Gabayre, who was a key leader in the coup. The dominant group era returned 
under Bare. He consolidated power in his first ten years (1969-1979), and he 
instituted a communist style party system to complete his power consolidation. In 
1978, the government foiled a coup plot, and executed some of the coup plotters.  
Other surviving coup plot leaders fled the country and established opposition groups: 
the Somali National Movement (SNM), the Somali Salvation Democratic Front 
(SSDF) and the United Somali Congress (USC), in 1981, 1981, and 1989, 
                                                          
8
 A number of anecdotal stories indicate that recruiters had difficulty in convincing clans to send 
delegates to represent them in the parliament. It is said that those who accepted did so 
reluctantly. Yet, when the government attempted the same process (4.5 formula) in the 1967 
elections, sub-clans began to fight about who would be their next representative in parliament 
because those recruited to participate in the 1961 parliament elections came back to their 
respective subclans with wealth; hence, enticing their kin to want a chance at that wealth 
(stories told to the author in research trips to Mogadishu on December 2004 and July-October 
2005). 
 
9
 Although the election was tainted, President Aden Abdulla Osman, the first Somali President, to his 
credit, ceded power peacefully after losing the election by two votes in the parliament who 
elected the President. There were 123 MP seats in the Somali Republic (1960-69). No 
President was installed after the assassination of President Sharmake, and the military took 
advantage of the chaos.  See figure 2 in the appendix for pre-conflicts governments and 
transitional governments formed since the fall of the military regime.   
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respectively. In his last decade, Bare symbolized the typical “Big Man” in Africa. 
Like other Big Men, Bare concentrated all power in his hands; the regime became 
predatory, blurring the line between private and public treasure; and Bare ran the 
country through patronage and rent-seeking become prevalent.
10
 Bare achieved phase 
I (strong center, stable, and non-democratic) of the dominant group model, but failed 
to transition to phase II (consolidation of power and institutionalization). Other 
countries in Africa, Kenya, Ghana, and Uganda, have successfully, albeit at different 
times, transitioned to phase II.  
The opposition groups continued to challenge Bare‟s regime; however, they 
lacked a unified front (Compagnon 1990). Each decided to face Bare in its clan 
stronghold (this was going back to the geographical separation of clans before 
colonialism). This decision most likely prolonged the life of Bare‟s regime, and it 
introduced alliances of convenience. In the last stand, the battle of Mogadishu, it was 
the United Somali Congress (USC) that overthrew Bare. Although the opposition 
groups claimed that their aim was to depose Bare and institute a power-sharing 
government in Somalia, individual actors had private interests – capturing the 
presidency. The competing private interests led to conflict between two leading 
figures in the USC: Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the late General Mohamed Farah Aidid.  
The personal leadership struggle between Mahdi and Aidid to capture the presidency 
and the benefits that come with it was not the only motive, however. A territorial 
conflict between their subclans (Haber Gidir and Abgal), and different national 
                                                          
10
 For a description of African Big Men see (Moss 2007).  
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support groups were also factors; Aidid was supported by former military personal 
while Mahdi was supported by former politicians, and they formed USC/SNA 
(Somali National Alliance) and USC/SSA (Somali Salvation Alliance), respectively. 
Several other alliances succeeded USC/SNA and USC/SSA as will be seen in the 
final chapter. Since 1991 anarchy has dominated South Central Somalia. The rift 
between Aid and Mahdi had both Hobbesian and Schmittian elements.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The common explanation for the conflict among political entrepreneur follows 
the dichotomy between Hobbesian and Schmittian theories.
11
 The first posits that civil 
war is the result of competing private interests motivated by greed in a self-help 
environment. The second conceives that civil war is due to political incompatibility 
motivated by group loyalty (Kalyvas 2003, 475). The literature on the Somali 
conflict(s) can be divided into those works whose arguments are institutional and 
those that emphasize Hobbesian and Schmittian. Both of these strains take a macro-
level approach and assume that a master clan cleavage is the driving force of the 
conflict. The power-sharing approach has been widely discussed in the literature on 
the Somali conflict, while the dominant group has been overlooked.  
 
 
                                                          
11
 Professor Kalyvas (2003) critiques Thomas Hobbes‟ and Carl Schmitt‟s explanation of conflict, 
which recently have been framed in the dichotomy between greed and grievance (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2002; Berdal and  Malone 2000).     
16 
 
Structuralism  
Donald Rothchild posits that ethnic conflicts in Africa are the result of a 
breakdown of “regularized patterns of relations” due to institutional failure (1997).  
While the colonial powers undermined informal rules in urban areas, they did not 
develop formal rules to replace them.  For example, by creating courts without the 
necessary technical knowledge and institutional support, colonial administrations 
weakened traditional systems of jurisprudence.
12
 Therefore, at the time of 
independence, Somalia, like other African states, embarked on state building with 
weak or non-existing institutions. Writing in 1968, Samuel P. Huntington cautioned 
that without institutional capacity newly independent states faced high risks when 
opening up political participation. The post-independence Somali government took 
this risk as 80 political parties competed for power in the 1961 and 1967 elections 
without institutional capacity (Omar 1993).    
Lyons and Samatar (1995) suggest that Somali traditional norms were 
weakened by a change of the mode of production from family based subsistence to a 
market economy. They add that urban development caused the decay and 
transformation of “kinship” because the individual did not need to relay on his/her kin 
in the post-colonial era. This, however, was only in major urban areas. And the 
                                                          
12
 Before the advent of the colonial powers, a murder was solved by the traditional leaders of the  
victim and  killer. The victim‟s kin could demand to execute the murderer or accept diya 
(material reward mostly in camels – 100 camels for male or 50 camels for female – or other 
type of asset). Whatever agreement the two groups reached on any given case, like the murder 
in our example, set precedents for future cases between the two groups.  The verdict became 
xeer. It was satisfactory for both groups. It also strengthened in-group policing because each 
group was liable for the wrongdoings of its members, so it was also a powerful deterrent. 
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changes affected mostly agriculture (all of which is in South Central Somalia), while 
nomadic life has not changed much, economically or socially. Lyons and Samatar‟s 
observation is in line with North‟s (1990) and Knight‟s (1992) explanations that 
informal rules weaken as society develops economically, information about the 
informal rules diminish, and enforcement weakens/fails. Ahmed I. Samatar (1988) 
posits that without that basic norm, kinship transformed into a decayed form – 
“clannishness” – that lacks the restraints that ordered clans and maintains internal 
cohesion and external peace with neighbors (in Doornbos and Markakis 1994).  
Doornbos and Markakis (1994) suggest there are two schools of thought 
explaining the role of clans (and informal rules clans lived by) in Somalia. The first 
school views clans as a menace and characterizes them as: “institutionalized 
instability” (Said Samatar 1990); “nomadic mentality” (Osman Rabeh 1988, and this 
is a common view among Somalis); “lineage ideology” (Ali Glaydh 1990); or 
“politicizing tribalism” (Abdi Samatar 1989; Yousuf S. A. Duhul 1993). The second 
school, a minority, characterizes clans as “trade unions” (Hussein M Adam 1992). 
The result was a divisive politics fueling intensive elite competition for power and 
control of rents.  
Hobbesian and Schmittian  
Hobbesian literature, as applied to Somalia, argues that the zero-sum 
competition to capture the state and gain control over its resources led to insecurity 
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among leaders and state collapse in Somalia.
13
 Elite-driven explanations of conflict 
have been documented elsewhere (Sambanis 2003). Sambanis notes that De 
Figueiredo and Weingast (1999) suggest that elites manipulate the public because the 
public lacks information about threats from other groups, which elites propagate.  
In the Schmittian literature, Rasmussen posits that the failure of a government 
to heed the demands of groups that feel deprived of socio-economic resources leads 
to conflicts (in Zartman and Rasmussen 2003). Mohamed Siad Bare‟s brutal 
repression culminating in collective punishment against the Majerteen clan and 
egregious clan cleansing against Isaaq (Terrence and Samatar 1995) is oft-cited as 
evidence that the Somali conflict directly correlates with political repression, a feeling 
of deprivation, and alienation of groups from the state.  
Paul Collier (2007) argues that evidence on the role of grievances in igniting 
conflicts is weak, while political repression (Jim Fearon and David Laitin cited in 
Collier 2007) and income inequality
14
 show no direct correlation with the start of 
conflict. Rather he argues, “[a] flagrant grievance is to a rebel movement what an 
image is to a business” (24). Collier has a point, in that grievances do not always 
provoke rebellion and that those suffering most do not have the means to rebel. This 
has been the case with the Banadiri and Bantu clans in Somalia who have suffered 
                                                          
13
 State collapse is defined as “a situation where structure, authority, law, and political order [within a 
 state] have fallen apart and must be reconstructed in some form, old or new” (I. William 
Zartman 1995, 1 quoted in Taras and Ganguly, 23-4). 
       
14
 Gudrun Ostby (2006) finds a correlation between horizontal inequalities and the advent of civil wars. 
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both under the military government and political entrepreneurs, although more 
severely under the latter, but have not rebelled.   
In the Somali case a number of authors adopt Hobbesian or Schmittian 
explanations, (see for instance, Doornbos and Markakis 1994; Menkhaus 2003, 2007; 
Mohamed 1993; Marchal 2006; Andrea 2002; Lyons and Samatar 1995; and Bakonyi 
and Stuvoy 2005). Some authors have argued that institutional failure – the 
deterioration of traditional norms and weak formal institutions – contributed to the 
conflict‟s onset and protraction (see, for instance, Lyons and Samatar 1995; Adam 
1997; Mohamed-Abdi 1997; Ceshekter 1997; and Menkhaus 2003). These studies, for 
the most part, diagnose the “Somali” conflict as a binary conflict – two groups against 
each other – led by unitary actors (i.e., political entrepreneurs) who generate and 
direct demands along a “master” clan cleavage. This explanation takes a macro-level 
(national) approach ignores dynamic interactions between identities, actions, and 
interests (Kalyvas 2003), and it fails to explain why conflict has not been protracted 
in other regions of Somalia but has persisted in the South Central region particularly 
in Mogadishu, the Somali capital, which has erroneously come to be synonymous 
with Somalia (Brydon 1999). Green and Seher (2002, as cited in Sambanis 2003) 
point out that the ethnic conflict literature suffers from analyzing macro-historical and 
political data without due attention to the individual and group levels. In this regard, 
the literature on Somalia is no different. It attempts to reduce the ambiguity of the 
conflict to discernible cleavages, traditionally between clans, and now involving 
religion, since the sudden rise and fall of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006. 
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The Puzzle 
This seemingly clear line of analysis – degeneration of the clan system and 
informal rules, competition over resources, concern for individual and group survival, 
and grievances of the vanquished – has glaring shortcomings, however. First, macro-
level analyses of the “Somali” conflict assume a driving master cleavage and frame 
the conflict in binary terms (i.e., one clan against another). Therefore, the power-
sharing model assumes that conflict is among clans; thus, the model does not take 
into account the role of alliance of convenience, which transcends clans and subverts 
transitional governments.  
Second, private interests and political goals interact. The political 
entrepreneurs act with the blessing of their supporters, who actively back them to gain 
power. In return, the supporters expect to benefit from their man‟s reign. This 
challenges the notion of “elite manipulation” of the public (De Figueiredo and 
Weingast 1999, cited in Sambanis 2003). The masses (from armed clans/subclans) are 
also “instigators” (Kalyvas 2003) as we will discuss below. 
Finally, alliances of convenience among actors in South Central Somalia are 
not well studied. A systematic review illustrates that alliances of convenience have 
undermined power-sharing agreements. As the final chapter illustrates identity is not 
static based on primordial ties (clan); rather, identity is fluid and transcends any 
master cleavage (e.g. clan, religion or any other). The actors at the center 
(Mogadishu) influence their allies in the periphery (other regions in South Central 
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Somalia). The periphery actors in South Central Somalia use their alliance with the 
center to gain power in their locales and advance local issues, sometimes, at the 
expense of national issues that the center wants to promote. The central actors use 
their alliance with periphery actors to extend the territory under their control and 
augment their bargaining power.  
The alliances of convenience explain why the South Central conflict is 
protracted and why the power-sharing model fails to end conflicts in South Central 
Somalia. These alliances breakdown once their aim is achieved. The alternative to the 
power-sharing model is therefore the dominant group model. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Why have South Central conflicts within Somalia been protracted?  My initial 
theory (explanation) was that informal rules (xeer) and traditional leaders play a role 
in conflict resolution even if the traditional rules are formalized (as in Somaliland). In 
fact, no formal rules can be established unless socially accepted informal are adopted 
(see North, 1990, Chapters 5 & 6). However, in the absence of traditional rules and 
actors, mutual trust and cooperation breakdown and conflict resolution is more 
difficult to achieve. There are three factors (hypotheses) that may influence conflict 
resolution: (i) individual credibility of sub-clan elders, (ii) the accepted informal rules 
beyond any specific individual and (iii) political entrepreneur, non-elder sub-clan 
leaders who ignore the informal rules.  
  H1 (Credibility Hypothesis): Conflict resolution is more feasible in regions 
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where sub-clan elders are credible and have bargaining power. Conflicts outside 
South Central Somalia are resolved through sub-clan elders with a strong reputation, 
respect and significant bargaining power.  
 H2 (Informal Rule Hypothesis): There is successful conflict resolution in 
regions where the informal rules (xeer) are generally accepted by all factions (sub-
clans). Beyond the individual reputation of sub-clan elders, the rules shape behavior.  
H3 (Political Entrepreneur Hypothesis): Conflict continues in regions where 
individual, non-elder sub-clan leaders (political entrepreneurs) subvert weak sub-clan 
elders and ignore weak informal rules.  
Methodology and limitations 
Before the collapse Somalia was divided into 18 regions. Most current studies 
(e.g., World Bank 2005), however, divide the country into three regions: (i) 
Somaliland (the northern territory within the territory of the former Republic of 
Somalia that declared its independence in 1991 and has remained functional despite 
the lack of international recognition); (ii) Puntland (northwestern territory that 
established a functioning administration but does not claim independence); and (iii) 
South Central Somalia which “… stretches from South Galka’ayo [small town 
bordering Puntland] to Liboye town, a border town between Kenya and Somalia.” 
There are 12 regions and 56 districts in South Central Somalia, it is endowed with 
fertile agricultural land, and the two rivers, Jubba and Shebelle, run through South 
Central Somalia (Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD) 2004).   
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Pinpointing the locus of protracted conflict in South Central Somalia is not 
easy. Contrary to my initial argument that the “Mogadishu” conflict has been 
protracted while other conflicts (both in South Central and other regions) have not 
been, Mogadishu conflicts have not been fought in a vacuum. Undoubtedly, 
Mogadishu as the capital city of Somalia where both power and resources are 
concentrated, has influenced the protraction of conflict in the rest of South Central 
Somalia. Equally important, South Central regions outside of Mogadishu have 
influenced and shaped the trajectory of conflicts in Mogadishu.  
There are some limitations, however, to this regional approach. First, there is 
the difficulty of comparing South Central to Puntland and Somaliland, both of which 
are smaller in population and territory, and have much less resources. All the major 
resources (rivers, agricultural land, and economic infrastructure like ports, airports, 
and large markets, see CRD 2004 conflict mapping in the appendix) are located in 
South Central Somalia. South Central has been the traditional seat of government 
based in Mogadishu including transitional governments established since the collapse 
of the military regime in 1991. South Central, specifically Benadir region, attracts the 
largest population in Somalia making South Central region demographically more 
heterogeneous (all clan families are found in South Central) as a result of systematic 
resettlements.   
The Italians resettled Majerteen in Benadir region from what has now become 
Puntland, Mohamed Siad Bare resettled Ogaden from Ogaden territories in northwest 
Somalia to Upper Jubba near Kismayo, and Habargidir and other Hawiye subclans 
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resettled in Benadir, Lower/Upper Jubba and Shebelle regions after the fall of Bare. 
Second, not all regions of South Central have been in constant conflict. Some regions 
have been at peace, others at war while others oscillated between minor and 
intermediate conflicts with lulls in between.
 15
 Finally, both USC/SSA and USC/SNA 
supported allies in Puntland and Somaliland, but Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed and 
Mohamed Ibrahim Igal defeated their opponents and emerged as the dominant leaders 
– the Presidents – Puntland and Somaliland, respectively; however, no dominant 
leader emerged in South Central Somalia. To account for these regional differences 
and in line with my micro-level approach, I have focused on identities, actions, and 
interests within South Central Somalia, and I accomplish this using the alliance 
framework.  
The study is cross-sectional and uses qualitative data. It relied on secondary 
data and reports.  I reviewed some primary documents – signed agreements, 
conference papers, communiqués, press releases, and news report.  
The aim of this thesis is to diagnose why conflict in South Central Somalia 
has been protracted. If we can figure out what factors play a role in conflict resolution 
outside South Central, then we can examine whether or not these factors exist or can 
be introduced in South Central. For example, if individual reputation of sub-clan 
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 A minor conflict is a conflict where at least 25 people died in battle-related deaths in each year of the 
conflict, but less than 1000 died during the entire conflict. See the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program concept definitions:  http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/definitions_all. Mogadishu 
conflict has varied. It was a civil war in 1991, 1992, and 1993 but later has become more of 
an intermediate war. The Somali conflict does not conform to Uppsala‟s definition of conflict 
as a situation in which one of the parties is a government because no functioning government 
has existed in Somalia since the collapse of the military regime in January 1991.   
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elders is the key factor in regional conflict resolution, then it may be the absence of 
strong clan elders that prevents conflict resolution in Mogadishu. Also, we know that 
we need to disaggregate the level of analysis to look at group relations below the 
assumed master clan. The kinship pyramid helps us to disentangle clan hierarchy and 
specify the level of conflict, so we can tailor solutions appropriate to that level.  
Thesis Map 
Chapter two defines the role of traditional leaders in conflict resolution and 
explains how they gain respect and credibility. With examples from Moqokori, a city 
in Hiraan region of South Central Somalia, the chapter elaborates where traditional 
leaders can be a potent force for conflict resolution and it tests H1 (credibility 
hypothesis). Second, the chapter defines informal rules; examines how they develop, 
their resurgences in some areas, and their limitation and it tests H2 (informal rules 
hypothesis). Third, the chapter defines political entrepreneurs and explores their 
influence on the conflict, and test H3 (political entrepreneur hypothesis). 
The final chapter examines how the alliance framework better explains the 
conflict drivers in South Central Somalia. It closely follows Kalyvas‟s examinations 
of the interaction between political interests and private actions, how individual actors 
gain and maintain support from their kin (community) for their personal goals, and 
the role of public in the conflict. Next, the chapter examines the symbiotic-parasatic 
relationship between the center and periphery actors. In the following section, the 
chapter explains the failures of power-sharing agreements and illustrates how 
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alliances of convenience undermined past agreements. The chapter concludes with 
the proposition of an alternative to the power-sharing model – the dominant group 
model. 
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CHAPTER II 
EVALUATING HYPOTHESES 
THE EROSION OF TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP 
The traditional leaders are (s)elected representative of their sub-clan.  Each 
clan leader is chosen depending on: his “integrity, honesty, truthfulness, justice, love 
for his people and be already known for his capacity and good conduct, not only by 
his clan but also by other clans” (Mathews 1993, 3).16 In addition to oratory skills, 
knowledge of xeer (informal rules) and Islamic religious principles are basic 
requirements. Traditional leaders also delegate power to other elders in the 
community, so traditional leaders rule by consensus (Lewis 1988).  
Bargaining power is the “relative ability to force others to act in ways contrary 
to their unconstrained preferences” (Knight 1992, 127). The assumption is that some 
actors are more powerful than others. Powerful actors constrain the weaker actors‟ 
choices; the weaker actors respect institutional rules because they don‟t have relative 
bargaining power to change institutional rules. Once actors establish a new 
equilibrium, change occurs slowly. Any actor(s) thinking about changing the 
equilibrium must consider his relative bargaining power and the feasibility that 
another or other actors will achieve a favorable outcome after a change. According to 
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 Only males have been selected as traditional leaders in Somalia. There have not been in Somali‟s 
 history any female warlords or politicians. The Somali political scene is men. So I 
continuously use the pronoun he to denote that Somali politics and traditional roles are male 
dominated.  
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Knight, successful bargaining depends on the “fundamental relationship between 
resource asymmetries, on one hand, and credibility, risk, and time preference, on the 
other” (1992 129, italics in the original). For an actor to influence others, he/she must 
be credible.  
Credibility is determined by the resources available to the actor, such as 
intelligence, previous experiences, and/or threats of retaliation. The rigorous selection 
process, shared decision making, and open debates give credibility and significant 
bargaining power to traditional leaders in each community. In addition, traditional 
leaders have the ability to provide rewards and/or impose sanctions. These give 
traditional leaders an immense influence and leverage over their subclan.  
As briefly discussed in the background section of the previous chapter, 
colonialists disrupted the power equilibrium by empowering a younger generation of 
leaders who did not rise through the normal ranks that brought traditional leaders to 
power. The new leadership, in return, challenged the position of the traditional 
leaders and competed against them, on behalf of their colonial masters, for the loyalty 
of their subclans. The struggle further intensified when aspiring actors challenged the 
new elite. Many of these groups were those seeking independence; some of which 
were former administrators or security guards for the colonial administrations. During 
the nine years of post-independence civilian government, the political competition 
become hostile as actors competed to capture rents. The rampant corruption 
demoralized the Somali public, who lost confidence in the government. To the 
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dismay of the public, the military junta did not bring lasting relief, but it was not the 
last disappointment, as the end of the military regime brought even worse 
catastrophes. Therefore, since the colonial powers disrupted the balance and the 
process of power, Somalis never recovered from it. This is not to blame the colonial 
regimes for the ills that Somalis brought on themselves, but it is to point that Somalis 
left their “ways”, to borrow Confucius‟s word, they failed to form institutions and 
enact policies conducive to state development. The traditional leaders lost their 
credibility to political entrepreneurs.     
Findings 
Political entrepreneurs have more credibility – resources and influence - than 
traditional leaders. Therefore, political entrepreneurs have broken agreements that 
traditional leaders have made. In the post-colonial era, political entrepreneurs 
politicized clans in order to capture power and wealth. Finally, Bare formalized 
clannish politics by heavily relying upon his clan, his wife‟s clan, and his mother‟s 
clan. The increased power, wealth, and status of political entrepreneurs has eroded the 
bargaining power of traditional leaders and their influence over the subclan. Rather 
than earning the loyalty of their kin, political entrepreneurs pay for it. Patronage has 
been the preferred currency of political elites to reward and punish their kin, so 
patronage has been a very potent weapon upon which many political entrepreneurs 
have built their careers since independence.       
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The political entrepreneurs have undermined the attempts of traditional 
leaders to mediate conflicts in Somalia. For example, when traditional leaders 
attempted to mediate between Murursade and Abgal subclans, both members of the 
Hawiye clan family (KP6), conflict political entrepreneurs reignited the fight. This 
phenomenon – undercutting traditional leaders – is not unique to Mogadishu. In the 
Galgudud, a region of South Central Somalia bordering Puntland, conflict between 
Sa‟ad and Saleeban, both subclans of Habargidir (KP4), traditional leaders efforts 
were undercut by political entrepreneur who were funneling ammunition, money, and 
moral support (CRD unpublished).
17
   
The intra-subclan struggle for power has eroded not only the credibility of 
traditional leaders but also inter-subclan solidarity. Unity has given way to 
fragmentation precipitated by competition over subclan loyalty (see disintegration of 
United Somali Congress (USC) in the final chapter). As new actors emerge within a 
subclan and challenge the establishment elite who resist sharing power and status, 
often violent struggles ensue. The disintegration of subclan unity as a result of 
internal subclan power struggles erodes the influence of traditional leaders. If a 
traditional leader sides with one side, he loses moral authority over the subclan. If, on 
the other hand, he attempts to be neutral, he loses practical authority and is perceived 
to be irrelevant. For example, Hiraab traditional leaders failed to reconcile the late 
General Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, Habargidir traditional 
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 The author was also present in consultation conducted in Mogadishu August-Sept 2005 where 
traditional leaders in the meeting directly confronted their kin in the room and accused of 
dabhuris, (“fanning the fires”). 
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leaders failed to prevent or resolve the Aidid and Osman Ali Ato break up, while 
Abgal traditional leaders failed to stop the bloodshed between Muse Sudi Yallahow 
and Omar Mohamed Finish (see figure 4).  
This is not to suggest that traditional leaders are no longer relevant in Somalia. 
But it is to say that traditional leaders – both in urban and rural areas – are viable only 
when they address issues other than competition over power and rents. Traditional 
leaders do still have influence over issues like marriage and diya (“blood-wealth”).  
Case study 
Moqokori is a Somali village situated in the Hiraan region, part of South 
Central Somalia. It is close to the Middle-Shabeele region, so it straddles the Abgal 
and Hawadle subclan territories. The conflict on which the report used in this case 
study is based took place between October 7 and 13, 2007. According to the Center 
for Research and Dialogue (CRD) report, the “causes of the conflict in the area were 
mainly camels rustling and land [this was very small and mostly arid] grabbing” 
(CRD, unpublished report).
18
 Because it involved traditional wedge issues, traditional 
leaders intervened. The Ugaas “chief” Abdirahman of Hawadle and Imam “chief” 
Mohamud Imaam Omar of Abgal led their respective delegations.
19
 After weeks of 
deliberation, they selected a committee of 40 representatives who agreed on 
compensation to be paid by each subclan to the other. Moreover, they agreed to enact 
                                                          
18
 I am grateful to CRD assistant researcher, Sadia who, provided me with copy of the draft report after 
 reading about Moqokori reconciliations on www.hiiraan.com. 
  
19
 Different Somali subclans have different titles for their chiefs; other subclans for example use: 
 Boqor, Malaq, and so on.   
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new xeer, although it was put off because previous xeer required that new xeer cannot 
be established “when there are … pending issue or unfinished business such as 
unpaid Diyya (sic) compensation or a claim that has not been accepted yet” (CRD, 
unpublished report).   
While traditional leaders have succeeded in Moqokori, their failure in 
Galgudud, Bay and Bakool, Lower and Upper Shabeele, and Benaadir (all part of 
South Central) regions illustrates the erosion of traditional leaders‟ bargaining and 
enforcement power on the most contested issues of power and rents.  
Traditional leaders are only relevant where dominant leaders emerge and 
internal challengers are neutralized. In these environments, as was the case in 
Somaliland and Puntland, traditional leaders can rubberstamp the wishes of the victor 
and lend moral support to consolidate power. To make other groups (losers) feel 
included in the process, a dominant leader can concede some leverage to traditional 
leaders as they don‟t challenge his political power. Without the emergence of 
dominant leaders, traditional leaders are relegated to irrelevancy on reconciling 
power, resources, and territory struggles because there are too many political 
entrepreneurs contesting to represent the subclan.  
The findings falsify H1 (the credibility hypothesis). The traditional leaders are 
credible only pertaining to issues that don‟t deal directly with power struggle and 
rents. They also have less bargaining power than political entrepreneurs. Conflicts 
outside South Central are not resolved through subclan elders with a strong 
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reputation, respect, and significant bargaining power; rather, it is the emergence of a 
dominant leader that ended conflicts in Somaliland, Puntland, and South Central 
Somalia (briefly), when the Islamic Court Union (ICU) consolidated power.  
INFORMAL RULES 
The conception of norms varies,
20
 and I adopt Jean Ensminger and Jack 
Knight‟s (1997, 2) definition that “…social norms are informal rules that structure 
behavior in ways that allow individuals to gain the benefits of collective action.” 
Informal rules order the society, clarify ambiguity, and define the roles of each 
member, because “the threat of violence is a continuous force for preserving order” 
(North 1990, 47). Informal rules are internally enforced standards of conduct by 
individuals, and they continue to function without an external enforcement 
mechanism.  
The degree of strength or weakness of the informal rules differs among 
regions in Somalia. The survival of informal rules outside of urban areas is due to a 
“dense social network [that leads] to the development of informal structures with 
substantial stability” (North 1992, 47). Directly, colonial, post-colonial, military, and 
post-military elite manipulation and attempts to exogenously formalize informal rules 
without institutional capacity weakened them. Indirectly, informal rules in urban 
areas in general and Mogadishu in particular have undergone evolutionary changes. 
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 For further discussion on conceptualization see Ensminger and Knight‟s account on the difference 
between Bailey (1969), Berth (1981); and Bourdieu (1977). 
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Two reasons cause the change of informal rules: (i) the diminishing information about 
the rules, and (ii) diminishing incentives to comply with informal rules. Information 
diminishes due to the growth of the population and/or the ambiguity of interpretation. 
In addition, the move from smaller (rural) communities to larger (urban) communities 
broadens social interactions. As the community expands the interaction between 
individual members decreases and information about rules diminishes. Anonymity 
weakens informal rules in Mogadishu due to limited interactions among the same 
individuals and lack of information and credible punishment, leading to 
“opportunism” (Knight 1992; North 1990; Fearon and Laitin 1996).21 As discussed 
above, the changes of power symmetry between traditional leaders and political 
entrepreneurs has contributed to the decline of informal rules. 
Resurgence of Informal Rules 
Terrence and Samatar‟s (1995) assertion that the “old Somali social order 
based on kinship [xeer], and Islam failed” does not explain the survival of traditional 
norms in some parts of the country and their resurgence after the fall of the military 
regime. Menkhaus writes, the “…informal system of governance can insure rule of 
law and exceptionally high level of personal security” (2003, 411). Groups (subclans) 
have provided a sense of security and trust through informal rules that create certainty 
between members to pursue economic and political gains (Bakonyi & Stuvoy 2005, 
465). 
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 Fearon and Laitin define opportunism as “self-interested behavior that has socially harmful 
consequences”. They list examples: “cheating, shirking, malfeasance, fraud, exploitation, 
embezzlement, extortion, robbery, and rape” (717).  
35 
 
Mohamed-Abdi Mohamed asserts that “the modern state formulated its own 
laws, but time proved that its real influence was limited to the cities. Outside the 
cities, people have preserved their traditional system of government” (1997, 151). 
The preservation of xeer in rural areas proved to be wise because people rediscovered 
“the value and utility of” xeer (Adam 1997, 115). When formal institutions become 
“haphazard, weak and corrupt”, informal rules solve the dilemma (Fearon and Laitin 
1996, 718). As result of state collapse, Somalis resurrected informal rules in some 
parts of the country (Adam 1997, 110). In particular, after the breakdown of the 
center (Mogadishu), some of the peripheries reverted back to informal rule (Ceshekter 
1997, 76-77; Menkhaus 2003, 407).  
Menkhaus (2003) observes that local administration emerges even in the most 
precarious situations and orders society by providing certainty and constraining actors 
under shared norms. For example, after the collapse of the military regime, many 
neighborhood watches sprung up because residents wanted to fend off militias. Some 
neighborhoods protected only their kin. In Bermuda, a small neighborhood, in the 
center of Mogadishu, all the roof tops of houses belonging to non-Abgal subclans 
were looted. Other area neighborhood watches protected their immediate neighbors 
regardless of clan (author‟s experience in Mogadishu, 1991-1996, and again on trips 
in December 2004 and July-October 2005).  
It is, thus, essential to differentiate between the degeneration of informal rules 
in the center (Mogadishu) and their survival in the periphery, or the rest of the 
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country. I argue that the farther away from Mogadishu the population resides, the 
stronger the kinship system and informal rules remain. Traditional actors have 
enforcement mechanisms in rural areas based on their subclan authority. Informal 
rules solve similar issues that they have solved in the past. Similarly, informal rules 
are limited to geographically separate areas in which subclans lived prior to the 
advent of colonialism.  
In a recent example, traditional leaders in Kismayo, a southern Somali city, 
agreed that if a member of a subclan murders a member of another subclan, the 
murderer must be executed before sunset. It is the obligation of the murderer‟s kin to 
hand the murderer over to the victim‟s kin. This is what Fearon and Laitin (1996) call 
“in-group policing”. In Kismayo the agreement has been publically applied so far in 
one case where the murderer was handed over and executed as agreed. There were 
other agreements (see Moqokori example above) where informal rules helped to solve 
a conflict. Although informal rules survived in some areas, their effectiveness was 
limited. 
Limitations of informal rules 
Although the informal rules filled the vacuum in solving minor apolitical 
issues, they were not capable of solving political issues. Informal rules did not 
develop the capacity to mediate among clans/subclans. In the pre-colonial era, 
informal rules were confined to small groups of people, the resources were in the 
hands of traditional leaders, and no challengers emerged in groups unless one rose 
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through the ranks as he aged, accrued respect, and proved his worthy in the 
community. Colonialists introduced new forms of rules that were alien to Somalis and 
used their new elite to carry them out. As result, informal rules never developed 
mechanisms to cross over and apply beyond one particular group. In other words, 
colonial intervention, corruption during 1960-1969, 21 years of military dictatorship, 
and 17 years of chaos in South Central Somalia undermined the transformation 
process of informal rules. 
The attempt of the Somali post-independence government to hastily transform 
the society by imposing alien, incomplete, and centralized formal rules without 
institutional capacity to implement weakened further informal rules. In addition, the 
military dictator, Mohamed Siad Bare, like the colonial and post-independence 
administrations before him, continued to undermine informal rules and replaced them 
with patron-client relations. After the fall of Bare‟s regime and without rules to order 
elite interaction, self-help became the order of the day in South Central Somalia, 
where only a hegemon (whether colonial rule or Bare) had constrained competing 
elites and held the city together through use of force.  
Contrary to my initial hunch that informal rules played a critical role in 
solving conflicts in Puntland and Somaliland, it was the consolidation of power that 
led to the stability in the two regions. The findings illustrate that informal rules and 
informal institutions are not effective under anarchy, and their utility is very limited.  
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POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS 
Political entrepreneurs are self-styled “leaders” who have no permanent 
loyalty to subclan. Although they derive their support from their kin, the kin circle 
has narrowed as result of internal struggles within subclans. There are several types of 
political entrepreneurs. One consists of former politicians. They participated in the 
democratically elected post-independence governments (1960-69). Many of these, 
although their number are decreasing due to age, are wealthy and command the 
respect of their subclan, gained from politics of patronage. Although they remain 
influential in South Central Somalia politics, they were not as prominent after the 
Bare military regime took power. The second group of political entrepreneurs is 
made-up of former military personal. Most of them were members of Bare‟s clique to 
the end of his regime while some of them defected and established opposition groups. 
A third group of political entrepreneurs is the warlords – a mix of former politicians 
(e.g., Mahdi, a parliamentarian in the Aden government), former military (e.g., Aidid, 
who was also a diplomat), businessmen (e.g., Ato), and religious leaders (e.g., Sheikh 
Hassan Dahir Aweys, who is also former military and most recently one of the two 
top leader so the Islamic Court Union).  
A common trait of all these groups is that they continuously have shifted 
alliances and have been on more than one side of the conflict.  The last group of 
political entrepreneurs is the so-called nabadoon – pseudo-traditional leaders who 
dwell in the cities. They are intermediaries between political elites and their kin. The 
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nabadoon was originally created by Mohamed Siad Bare‟s military regime to 
diminish the influence of the traditional leaders. While there is one traditional leader 
at the subclan level, there are a number of nabadoons in each subclan.  
With respect to the Entrepreneur Hypothesis (H3), we find that conflict 
continues in South Central regions. First, political entrepreneurs have more 
credibility, financial resource, militia, and external support (regional and international 
like Ethiopia) than traditional leaders, so the political entrepreneurs have higher 
bargaining power than traditional leaders. The entrepreneurs subvert weak subclan 
traditional leaders and ignore weak informal rules. Second, as discussed above, the 
traditional leaders‟ bargaining power has decreased over time beginning with the 
advent of colonialism and culminating with Mohamed Siad Bare‟s systematic 
weakening of their authority by replacing the traditional leaders with Nabadoon. 
Finally, the competition and internal struggles within subclans further eroded 
traditional leaders‟ moral and practical authority over their kin.  
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CHAPTER III 
EVIDENCE FOR THE ALLIANCE FRAMEWORK THEORY 
Introduction 
In a briefing to the United Nations Security Council, UN Special envoy for 
Somalia Ahmedou Ould Abdallah states: 
 
[The Somali conflict] is neither a liberation struggle, nor an ethnic or religious 
war.  It is not only a struggle for power among the clans as many believe.  
The frequently shifting allegiances between and within clans demonstrate that 
other factors are also responsible for the continued instability of the country.  
Within Somalia, warlords, activists, and their private militias have perpetuated 
the chaos and violence for their own benefit.  Overall, a small group drawn 
from various backgrounds and driven by lust for money and power, is fighting 
to fill the political vacuum. (December 17, 2007; emphasis added)
22
 
 
Ambassador Abdallah‟s analysis that conflict is not a clan conflict and that 
alliances of convenience is a driving force perpetuating the conflict are in line with 
my analysis. His suggestions, however, that few groups “driven by lust for money and 
power” is only partially correct, as I demonstrate below the public plays a role in the 
conflict. In addition, Ambassador Abdallah‟s analysis contradicts the power-sharing 
model that his employer, the UN, and other regional and international actors have 
promoted in the quest for forming a Somali state.  
                                                          
22
 Accessed at http://www.un-
somalia.org/UN_Special_Representative/Statements/SRSGStatement16.asp 
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As I argue below, the few political entrepreneurs have the backing of the 
general public, and both groups are seeking to capture rents. The interactions among 
private interests and political and ideological goals explain conflict in Somalia, in 
general, and the South Central region in particular. This chapter illustrates that the 
Somali conflict combines Hobbesian and Schmittian elements: private interests and 
political goals interact. Thus, the alliance framework is best suited to explain the 
failure of power-sharing agreements and the protraction of conflict in South Central 
Somalia with Mogadishu at the center.  
There are three key components of the alliance framework. The first is the 
“interaction between political and private identities and interests” (Kalyvas 2003, 
475) where identities and actions are fluid and not demarcated by a master cleavage 
(Kalyvas 2003). The second is the disjuncture between center and periphery; 
Mogadishu influences and is influenced by local issues in other South Central regions 
as well as other regions. The third is the formation of alliances of convenience across 
clan lines and regions in South Central Somalia. Somali political entrepreneurs have 
used alliances to undermine power-sharing agreements in South Central Somalia. In 
addition, alliances hinder the emergence of a dominant group. The chapter proceeds 
as follows: first it examines the Hobbesian and Schmittian theories in the Somali 
context; next it explains the center-periphery relations and their effects; third it briefly 
looks at the results of power-sharing agreements and how alliances of convenience 
have undermined them; and it concludes with evidence that shows the success of the 
dominant group model in Somalia. 
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HOBBESIAN & SCHMITTIAN THEORIES 
Rather than being an either/or situation, the South Central Somalia conflict 
combines elements from what Kalyvas (2003) calls Hobbesian and Schmittian models 
of conflict – a dichotomy that is currently presented as greed and grievance motives 
of conflicts. On one hand, there are individual political entrepreneurs who pursue 
private interest; on the other, they rely on the support of their kin and claim to be 
promoting political goals of their kin. Political entrepreneurs seek to gain power 
(means) to capture rents (an end goal) through clan/subclan identity (tool). The three 
reinforce each other. The political entrepreneurs pursue their private interests at the 
expense of the general welfare, but the general public is a willing culprit. The public 
provides material and spiritual support, and militias to political entrepreneurs. In 
return, the public expects that the political entrepreneurs will share future rents with 
them. Therefore, the protracted conflict in South Central Somalia is the result of 
interaction between private interests and political goals.  
Power as Means 
A political entrepreneur seeks to capture power. Vying for power predated 
Somalia‟s independence. In the preparation for independence about eighty political 
parties were established along subclan lines; individual leaders established parties to 
boost their chance in gaining access to government (Omar 1993). The government is 
the gateway to opportunities and access to upward mobility; hence, every aspiring 
leader seeks to capture government levers. This struggle intensified under Mohamed 
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Siad Bare‟s regime. His selective reward and punishment of certain clans/subclans 
made obvious what was at stake – survival of groups (clans/subclans), and a political 
elite is mindful what his/her fate will be if one is to become the loser. “The historical 
predatory state apparatus, the misuses and the abuses of state power and the lingering 
mistrust and prejudice among clans [it is more apt to say among political 
entrepreneurs] and communities created endless competition over the top leadership 
of the state” (CRD 2004, 25). The competition among political entrepreneurs in South 
Central Somali resembles Hirshleifer‟s (2001) Machiavelli theorem – “whereby no 
advantageous opportunity to exploit someone will be missed” (as cited in Collier et. 
al., 2003, 54).  
Rent-seeking as the Goal 
One of the drivers of these competitions is rent-seeking – pilfering resources 
from the general public, via the state when it existed, and directly in the conflict years 
from the public. In the first, rent-seeking redistributes and does not produce any 
value. It creates incentives for all ambitious entrepreneurs to apply their skills in 
search of capturing the state. It also creates disincentives in pursuing other productive 
entrepreneurial activities. It becomes destructive because it creates intensive 
competition over capturing states, because, like Roma and China of the past (see 
Baumol 2008), in Somalia prestige and wealth were garnered through the state (1960-
1991).  During the anarchy (1991-present), political entrepreneurs have been trying to 
create a vampire state to accrue prestige and wealth. 
44 
 
The political entrepreneurs are the wealthiest people in Somalia.
23
 To amass 
such wealth, the Members of Parliament both in the Transitional National 
Government (TNG) and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (created in Arte 
Djibouti in 2002 and in Mbagati, Kenya in 2004, respectively) joined the parliaments 
to gain access to rents (Andre Le Sage 2002, 35). The parliament seats were 
distributed based on clan/subclans.  
Clans as Tools 
Clans/subclans serve as tools for political entrepreneurs to capture power and 
control rents. “Since the clan structure is in many cases used to defend individual clan 
members and their property, the then emerging politicians capitalized on the clan 
sentiments by appealing to their respective clans for protection and support in the 
pursuit of individual political ends” (CRD 2004, 21). So while pursuing a private 
goal, political entrepreneurs marry their goals with clan/subclan interests, so the 
private interests become communal interests  because “in the struggle for positions in 
the state of the future – this is what internecine struggle is about – the clan is the 
invariable controlling element” (Doornbos and Markakis 1994, 86). The interaction 
between the private interests of political entrepreneurs and clans/subclans‟ goals led 
Bakonyi and Stuvoy (2005, 373) to conclude that “the whole system of warlordism is 
embedded in local society… [they] have ties to the local and regional social 
structure”, and so the political entrepreneur  exists on the support from their kin.  
                                                          
23
 CRD/WSP International, Country Note: Path to Recovery, Spring 2004 cited in CRD May 2004, 26. 
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The private interests 
In the struggle against Mohamed Siad Bare‟s military regime, the opposition 
leaders (most of them former government members) had private grudges against the 
regime. Some were former politicians under the brief democratic government while 
others were former members of the military regime who fell out of favor with Bare‟s 
clique. The opposition leaders disguised their private interests as political goals of 
their clan/subclan.  
An extreme case of personal loss becoming a group and national grievance 
was the formation of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) in 1989, after the 
Minister of Defense General Gabyo, from Ogaden lineage, was demoted from his 
position and arrested (Lyons and Samatar 1995). Similarly, Majerteen and Isaaq 
leaders, most of them former government officials who were purged, rallied their 
subclans against the military government. In 1978, the Somali Salvation Democratic 
Front (SSDF) led by Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed began a rebellion against Bare, who 
responded with brute force and exacted collective punishments against the Majerteen 
for their “support” for the rebellion (Afyare and Barise 2006).24 In 1988, the Somali 
National Movement (SNM) surprised the regime by taking over Hargeisa, a northern 
Somali town and stronghold of the Isaaq clan (KP5). Bare responded with fierce 
military might, and over 60,000 civilians were killed while hundreds of thousands 
fled across the border to Ethiopia (Afyare and Barise 2006). Elite conflict of interest 
                                                          
24 Barise, Afyare Abdi Elmi and Dr Abdullahi. "The Somali Conflict: Root Causes, Obstacles, and 
Peace-Building Strategies." African Security Review  15., no. 1 (2006): 32-54. 
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continued to plague the prospect of reconciliation within clans and subclans after the 
fall of Bare.  
While Isaaq leaders had private grudges against the military dictator, 
Mohamed Siad Bare, they also had communal justifications for their grievances. For 
example, Charles Ceshekter writes that the Isaaq subclan, who were 35% of the total 
population, received only 3% of aid in 1985-1990 (1997, 79). So the Isaaq subclan 
members supported the Somali National Movement (SNM) against Bare‟s regime. 
Hence, an oft-overlooked phenomenon in the conflict literature is role the general 
public play in instigating and sustaining civil wars.  
The general public: victims or instigators? 
Clans/subclans legitimize the claims of political entrepreneurs and provide a 
base of support, thus making the conflict impersonal – for example political 
entrepreneurs are able to disguise their personal interests as communal interests. 
Moreover, clans/subclans actively aid their individual actor(s) to capture power and 
rents.  
 There is a symbiotic relationship between political entrepreneurs and their 
subclan base of support. Individual subclan members are expected to amass wealth 
while they have power and are required to share that wealth with the rest of the kin 
(CRD 2004, 26). Political actors share the spoils of office with their kin in return for 
protection and legitimacy. The kin, therefore, are active and willing participants 
rather than victims manipulated by their leaders, as Kalyvas (2003) argues. It can be 
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argued that political entrepreneurs may be at the mercy of their subclan base, because 
if the former does not provide the expected benefits, their survival is at stake.  
During Mohamed Siad Bare‟s military regime, his Marehan subclan members 
had unrestricted access to rents, and other clans/subclans have long resented Bare‟s 
patronage – legalized rent-seeking. After the fall of the military regime, rampant 
cleansing of Marehan subclan and the Darood clan families, Mohamed Siad Bare‟s 
kin, from Mogadishu took place as revenge for preferential treatments the Marehan in 
particular and some Darood in general have received under Bare.  In an instant, 
anyone who was not Hawiye fled Mogadishu.    
Strong clans confiscated fertile land and forced population displacements. It 
has become a common tactic for political entrepreneurs to annex productive land. The 
resettling of one‟s kin in valuable areas increases that leader‟s bargaining power. 
While the leader gains his kin‟s support, the kin benefits from the resources and new 
status gained under their leader. Many new subclans have resettled in fertile lands 
between rivers since the fall of the Somali state. This has displaced unarmed groups 
and changed the demographic in central-southern Somalia in favor of armed groups 
who benefited from the state collapse (World Bank 2005 and CRD 2004).  
The Somali people inhabiting the central regions of the country, here termed 
as pastoralists, have directly inherited the legacy of Somalia‟s past political 
grievances, and during the civil war, this legacy could be observed as a 
cornerstone of the present socio-political conflict in the region. The 
pastoralists migrated to the southern fertile agricultural lands after 1991, and 
occupied both the public and private agricultural plantations and other 
facilities in the agriculturally rich fertile lands of the region. They also 
occupied the urban cities i.e. public and private buildings and, as a result, have 
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also dominated parts of the economic sector, many of them as employees to 
the armed patrons of their kinship, and most importantly, for political reasons 
- as many of the pastoral groups are heavily armed (whole groups of people 
take over rather than one person). This conflict between the pastoralists and 
agriculturalists is creating new social relations within and between clans.  This 
new trend is based on new hierarchy of power, new legitimizing ideologies 
and new forms of clan and regional power structure. (CRD 2004, 19) 
 
The population in general is not passive participants but “instigators” as well 
(Kalyvas 2003). Subclans support their leaders willingly. As discussed previously, 
they provide fighting forces and legitimize their leader‟s claims to power. For 
example, although women have suffered in the protracted conflict in Somalia, they 
have also contributed to conflict protraction. Naima Abdi Hashi, a Mogadishu 
University student participating in a joint course with the University of Kansas, writes 
women supported militias and political entrepreneurs by providing spiritual and 
financial support. Some women even sold their valuables to raise funds for war 
because the women believe they will be secure under their kin. 
The most important support that clans/subclans can give to their political 
entrepreneur is manpower, a role that clan militia play. Mooryaan
25
 (militias) form 
along the kinship pyramid hierarchy. They operate under a subclan‟s banner. In 
“peace time” they provide security for their kinship because, without a strong militia, 
                                                          
25
 CRD May 2004 divides the militias into five groups: “functional, business, Islamic Sharia, freelance, 
and private Guard”. Each groups has overlapping allegiances depending on which subclan is 
highest when subclan is in conflict. Each militia group has its own interest and agenda; some 
are brutal – freelance and functional – while others are more organized – Islamic sharia, 
business and private guards. All have committed some degree of human rights violations (P. 
40).  
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a kinship group will fall prey to other militias. Andrew Le Sage writes that the only 
time militias respond to traditional leaders is when the latter pleads with the former to 
defend a subclan (2002, 135).
26
 Even when militias respond to the elders‟ call to take-
up arms, it is not an altruistic response; rather, militias are enticed by the possible 
plunder to be had while at the same time defending their subclan‟s interest. Charles 
Ceshekter writes that the mooryaan who assisted in overthrowing the military regime 
in Somalia had “no program, no ideology, and no hope of taking over the country” 
(1997, 88). The aim of most mooryaan is to gain power and control over resources 
(World Bank 2005 and Roland 1996). Pillaging was a form of payment for militias 
who laid claim to property left behind by the regime and the Darood KP6 (clan 
families) who hastily fled Mogadishu. Motivation to fight, however, was initially 
based on “clan affiliation”, so passion and insecurity played a role.  
The clan/subclan as a “unit of survival” is a double-edged sword. The public 
and political entrepreneur symbiotic relations can strengthen clan/subclan, but it can 
also lead to fragmentation as clan/subclan internal power struggle intensifies.  The 
support for individual actors results in the disintegration of subclans. When a 
challenger emerges in a subclan, he needs a base of support in his kin. To achieve 
this, an actor needs to divide his kin and appeal to those closest to him on the kinship 
pyramid. So, if the challenger is challenging someone say at KP5 (clan), he will 
appeal to KP4 (subclan), and so on. The fragmentation erodes loyalty to the larger kin 
                                                          
26
 Warlords have three types of militias: paid permanent militia, temporary hires when conflicts erupt, 
and free subclan militias when there is medium/major conflict with other subclans.   
 
50 
 
as actors appeal to a narrower and narrower kin base, down to the level of KP2 
(extended families). Internal power struggle led to the disintegration of the United 
Somali Congress (USC), the Hawiye opposition group that toppled Bare‟s regime.  
 
Figure 4 – the disintegration of the United Somali Congress (1991-2000) 
 
 
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: By author 
USC/SSA versus USC/SNA 
The personal struggle between Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the late General 
Mohamed Farah Aideed – both men were from Hiraab, one of the Hawiye clan 
families, led to disintegration of the USC and ushered in alliances of convenience.  
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Mahdi and Aidid wanted to capture the presidency of a future Somali state after they 
defeated Mohamed Siad Bare. After the fragmentation of USC, each man formed an 
alliance of convenience. After Mahdi‟s proclamation of presidency of the first 
transitional government, Aidid rejected it, and conflict erupted engulfing Mogadishu. 
Aidid formed the USC/SNA (Somali National Alliance) while Mahdi formed 
USC/SSA (Somali Salvation Alliance). Each sponsored national reconciliation 
conferences and announced the creation of administrations. Each man rallied his 
subclan, further deepening suspicion and hatred among subclans. Related to the 
conflict over power, Mahdi and Aidid clashed over territory and resources like aid 
and ports.
27
 The Abgal KP4 (subclan) saw the Habargidir KP4 (subclan) as illegal and 
illegitimate occupiers and sought to evict them from Mogadishu.  Marchal (1996, 
218) writes, Mahdi “asked the Haber Gidir (sic) to return to their homeland in 
Galgudud and Mudug.” Although some Habargidir lived in Mogadishu before the 
war, the majority of them were “soo galooti”, or newcomers who arrived after the fall 
of the military regime.  The perception that Habargidir nomads were going to replace 
the Darood as the beneficiaries of foreign aid – potentially the biggest source of rents 
– was not limited to Abgal suspicions (Marchal 2006).  
 
                                                          
27
 The fertile agricultural land in Jubba and Shebelle was highly contested as political entrepreneurs 
competed to control banana exports as well as other agricultural goods. The “banana wars” 
were intense in the early 1990s. For further discussions see Hansen, Stig Jarle. "Civil War 
Economies, the Hunt for Profit and the Incentive for Peace: The Case of Somalia." The 
University of Bath, 2007.  
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USC/SNA: Aidid versus Ato 
The struggle over the presidency further fragmented the USC/SNA alliance 
creating two factions one led by the late General Aidid and the other by his former 
financier and Lieutenant Osman Hassan Ali Ato. While both belong to the Habargidir 
KP4 (subclan) of Sa‟ad KP3 (number of extended families), Aidid is Reer Jalaf KP2 
(extended families) and Ato is Reer Hilowle KP2. Ato broke away from Aidid after 
he felt that Aidid did not give him a high enough profile position in the government 
Aidid formed in 1995.
28
 Ato felt betrayed after being loyal to Aidid. Ato and Aidid 
fought one of the bitterest conflicts in Mogadishu from 1995 to Aidid‟s death.   
To counter balance Aidid‟s military might, Ato formed an alliance of 
convenience with the USC/SSA side. With Mahdi‟s blessings, Muse Sudi Yallahow, 
at the time USC/SSA deputy chairman, provided a safe heaven for Ato. Ato and 
Mahdi were further angered when Aidid ordered the disarming of militias in 
Mogadishu, and they scolded him for the illegal confiscation of weapons.
29
 When 
Aidid tried to levy taxes on banana imports in November 1995, “[his] two main 
rivals, Mahdi and Ato, responded by denying banana-exporting companies access to 
Somali ports (Indian Ocean Newsletter 7 Oct. 1995, 4; United Nations 19 Jan. 1996, 
3; USAID 29 Nov. 1995, 1; Voice of Somali Pacification 1 Oct. 1995; Reuters 17 
                                                          
28
 Ibid. 
 
29
 As cited in (IRB), The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. "Issue Paper Somalia  
Chronology of Events June 1994- April 1995 (Supplement to Chronology of Events 
September 1992-June 1994)",  July 1995 
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Oct.”30 Aidid and his opponents Ato and Mahdi remained bitter rivals until Aidid‟s 
death in August 1996 (Aidid was mortally wounded in a fight against Ato and Sudi 
forces in the Medina district of southern Mogadishu; Aidid died few days later). 
Aidid‟s successor, his son and a former U.S. Marine, Hussein Mohamed Farah Aidid, 
continued the rivalry and vowed to „“eliminate his domestic and foreign adversaries‟” 
after his father passed away (IPS 9 Aug. 1996; Journal de Genève et Gazette de 
Lausanne 24 Aug. 1996). After the remarks, Ato and Mahdi were quick to condemn 
him.
 31
   
 USC/SSA: Mahdi versus Sudi 
Mahdi‟s USC/SSA suffered a breakdown of its own. Muse Sudi Yalahow 
broke ranks after Mahdi, Hussein Aidid, and Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, a political 
entrepreneur from Murursade subclan of Hawiye set up a joint administration in 
August 1998. Mahdi and Muse were from Abgal KP4 (subclan). Between 1998 and 
2001, Mahdi and Muse supporters fought a number of times. For example, in late 
March 1999, when Muse attempted to levy taxes in Karan district in northern 
Mogadishu, Mahdi‟s stronghold, Sudi clashed with Mahdi supporters. Mahdi and 
Sudi belligerency continued although their conflict was not as fierce as that of Aidid 
and Ato or even Muse and Finish as we discuss next.  
                                                          
30
 As cited in (IRB), The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. "Issue Paper Somalia 
Chronology of Events  June 1994-April 1995 (Supplement to Chronology of Events 
September 1992-June 1994)",  July 1995 
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USC/SSA: Sudi versus Finnish 
Sudi‟s USC/SSA broke down when he fought his former lieutenant Omar 
Mohamed Finish for control of Medina district in southern Mogadishu. Sudi and 
Omar Finish, were both members of the Da‟ud KP3 (number of extended families) of 
the Abgal subclan.
32
 Their hostilities further intensified after Finish joined the 
Transitional National Government (TNG), which Sudi as a founding member of 
Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SSRC) opposed it. The two fought a 
fierce battle in the Medina district of southern Mogadishu destroying a district that for 
the most part survived most of clashes between Aidid and Ato.  
The disintegration of USC illustrates that intra-subclan has been more intense 
than inter-subclan conflict. Second, it shows that power-sharing agreements have 
intensified intra-subclan struggle as aspiring leaders (former lieutenants and deputies) 
challenged their superiors and sought to become leaders. This phenomenon is not 
unique to Somalia, as recent power struggles in Darfur (Sudan) evidences. Alliances 
of convenience have allowed weaker actors to survive and challenge more powerful 
actors as the alliances dilute power symmetry. The alliances also transcend clan and 
regions. 
 
 
                                                          
32
 The two fought in Mogadishu over control of the Medina district and a makeshift airport. Later, 
Finish joined TNG and Muse joined SSRC, and this fueled their conflict. 
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CENTER & PERIPHERY RELATIONS 
Symbiotic Relations 
Like symbiotic relations between political entrepreneurs and the public, there 
is similar a symbiotic relation between local and central actors (this is not only 
confined to physical location but also along the kinship pyramid). A review of the 
relationship between political entrepreneurs in Mogadishu and those in other parts of 
South Central Somalia as well as other regions illustrates that local and central issues 
are intertwined. These relationships transcend master cleavages. Contrary to the 
assumption that the Somali conflict is between clans, it has been rarely been so. After 
the fall of Bare and breakdown of the United Somali Congress (USC), there has not 
been conflict at KP6 (clan families). Major conflict between Darood and Hawiye, the 
two major clan families, ended after the Hawiye aborted Bare‟s attempted comeback 
to retake Mogadishu. The lack of conflict among clan families is not by a chance, but 
it is the result of alliances of convenience that transcends clans.  
Bay and Bakool  
One periphery conflict in which USC/SNA and USC/SSA got involved was in 
Bay and Bakool region. Aidid and Mahdi supported the Somali Democratic 
Movement/Somali Salvation Alliance (SDM/SSA) and the Somali Democratic 
Movement/Somali National Alliance (SDM/SNA), respectively. When the Digil and 
Mirifle subclans in the Bay region of southern Somalia proclaimed the formation of 
an administration, the USC/SNA rejected it and attempted to assert control. On the 
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other hand, USC/SSA supported Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), the armed 
group for Digil and Mirifle, against USC/SNA in Bay and Bakool regions. After 
“Aidid capture[d] the town of Baidoa in southwest Somalia [,] his rival, Ali Mahdi, 
threaten[ed] to declare 'all-out war' on him if he does not withdraw from the town 
within the next 24 hours.”33  
On their side, SDM used their alliances with USC/SSA and USC/SNA at the 
center. In the end, however, local, private issues trumped Aidid‟s and Mahdi‟s 
centralist goals, and SDM/SSA and SDM/SNA “decide[d] to work together to counter 
the violence perpetrated by General Aidid's faction.”34 SDM leaders used their 
alliance with both USC/SNA and USC/SSA until the alliance no longer served SDM 
purposes.  
Kismayo 
Another periphery-center conflict was in Kismayo, a southern city and home 
to one of the three major sea ports in Somalia. USC/SSA supported former General 
Mohamed Said Hersi Morgan, a son-in-law of Mohamed Siad Bare and former 
minister of defense of Bare‟s military regime, in Kismayo against former Colonel 
Mohamed Omar Jess backed by USC/SNA. While Somali factions met in Ethiopia 
for a reconciliation conference in March 15, 1993, Morgan captured Kismayo. This 
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  As cited in (IRB), The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. "Issue Paper Somalia 
Chronology of Events June 1994- April 1995 (Supplement to Chronology of Events 
September 1992-June 1994)", July 1995 
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angered Aidid who suspected that the UN, which had presence, in Kismayo at the 
time gave Morgan tacit approval (Lyons and Samatar 1995). The conflict in Kismayo 
thwarted national reconciliation as Aidid withdrew from the conference, so local 
conflict between Morgan and Jess trumped the central interest. Similar to Baidoa and 
Kismayo, USC/SSA supported resistance fighter in the capital city of the Hiiraan 
region, Beletweyne, against USA/SNA and its allies in the region.
35
  
Parasitic Relations 
The local actors subvert central goals in pursuit of local agendas. First, 
Mooryaan undermined United Somali Congress‟ ideological goals. After the United 
Somali Congress (USC) drove Mohamed Siad Bare out of Mogadishu, USC 
leadership was unable to control the unruly groups of mooryaan.
36
 Although 
mooryaan were theoretically under the control of the clan/subclan, in reality, they 
were not accountable to the clan/subclan leadership. The mooryaan gained the upper 
hand by their control over combat material, making them relatively immune to 
reprisals. Charles Ceshekter writes that the ransacking of Mogadishu was revenge for 
the exclusion and deprivation that many clan militias felt; everything that belonged to 
government was seen as liable to looting because it was viewed as stolen property 
(1997, 87). Marchal (2006) suggests that lack of control over mooryaan contributed 
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 Ibid. 
 
36
 There were a number of mooryaan formed under subclans (and sometimes several militias in one 
subclan). These militias worked independent of any political entrepreneur for the most part 
unless they were paid security guards for a particular political entrepreneur. The number of 
militias in South Central Somalia is not known but I estimate to be in tens of thousands. 
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to the failure of South Central Somalia to achieve peace. Mooryaan hijacked any 
ideological struggle that USC leadership claimed to represent.  
Second, before the UN withdrawal, the late General Aidid and Mahdi agreed 
on a joint administration composed of six men selected by each to run Mogadishu‟s 
port and seaport. This was an attempt to prevent chaos as well as to extract rents. 
Fearing that he did not gain from their cooperation, “Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, head 
of the Murursade faction in Mogadishu, denied[d] he existence of this joint Ali 
Mahdi-Aidid committee and further claim[ed] that only militia loyal to Aidid 
control[ed] the airport and seaport.”37 Qanyare was Mahdi‟s ally before he defected to 
Aidid, so his intention was to undermine the cooperation. He succeeded in this, as the 
agreement did not hold after UN left.
 38
  
Third, even when major factional leaders reach agreement, other groups who 
feel their interest has been left out gear up to undermine it. For example, in July 30, 
1998, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, Hussein Aideed, and Mohamed Qanyare agreed “to form 
a joint provincial administration” based in their respective Mogadishu enclaves. 
“However, this agreement did not lead to a more permanent settlement. Nominal 
supporters of both Aideed and Ali Mahdi objected to the agreement, generally on 
grounds of personal self-interest or the interests of their clan. In one brief instance, 
                                                          
37
 Ibid. 
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 Italics are mine, this illustrates how local issues subvert national or group goals. In this case both 
Aidid and Mahdi wanted to establish joint administration, but their allies did not see the 
process as beneficial to them, so they thwarted it.  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/somalia-south.htm 
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an opponent of the agreement launched a violent attack to undermine one of the 
agreement's key elements, the reopening of Mogadishu harbor”.39 Sudi and Ato, 
among others objected to it. CRD succinctly summarizes the marriage of convenience 
between private interests and political goals: 
 
The current armed political factions are the main political protagonists in 
South Central Somalia whose primary interest is focused on extending their 
power base beyond the clan boundaries through shifting alliances with other 
factions in the region. This type of narrow interest and its propagation is 
linked with other secondary interests that are prerequisites for the realization 
of their primary interest. Managing the grey area (the overlap) between the 
interests (political power, institutional dominance of one clan/ethnic group 
over the other) amalgamated with hidden opportunistic interests creates a 
contentious environment that has many times triggered conflict. (2004, 29) 
 
Fourth, after the Islamic Court Unions (ICU) defeated Mogadishu‟s powerful 
political entrepreneurs, in the summer of 2006, the hardliners in the ICU overpowered 
the moderate wing. In the end, this led to the defeat of the ICU (Menkhaus 2007). 
Thus, the hardliners subverted ICU interests because they confirmed the fear of the 
United States that Somalia might become a safe heaven for terrorism. In the process, 
the belligerent rhetoric of the ICU gave the TFG and its Ethiopian allies an excuse for 
invading Somalia with the tacit approval of the international community. Moreover, 
the ICU regrouped in Asmara, Eretria and joined Alliance for Re-Liberation of 
Somalia (ARS), which includes parliament members who have left Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG), and members of the Diaspora.  
                                                          
39
 Global Security Report, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/somalia-south.htm, 
emphasis are mine 
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Fifth, ARS‟ central goal, however, has been undermined by Al-Shabab, the 
military wing of the ICU, which includes most former hardliners in the ICU. Al-
Shabab militias carry out daily, Iraqi-style insurgent attacks against TFG and 
Ethiopian forces.  
There have been a number of belligerent exchanges through the media 
between the ARS leadership in Asmara, Eritrea and Al-Shabab, who vow to drive 
Ethiopia out by force.  The chasm between Al-Shabab and the ARS has widened, and 
the leaders of the former publicly denounced the ARS‟ attempt to negotiate with the 
Transitional Federal Government. Al-Shabab leaders even have vowed to undermine 
any attempt to seek political solution. In a 2008 article, Voice of America summarized 
the conflict between Al-Shabab and ARS: 
…while the Islamist insurgents may share the same short-term goal of 
defeating Ethiopia and bringing down the interim government, extensive 
interviews with more than a dozen people reveal the insurgency is actually 
being waged by two distinct Islamist groups - fervent nationalists loyal to the 
Islamic Courts Union on one side, and religious zealots belonging to the 
home-grown, ultra-radical Shabab group on the other.
40
 
 
THE FAILURE OF THE POWER-SHARING MODEL 
Previous internationally-sponsored Somali reconciliation initiatives have 
focused on KP6 (Clan Families) in an effort to achieve KP7 (i.e., a nation). The 
                                                          
40 VOA new on April 3, 2008, 
http://www.hiiraan.com/print2_news/2008/Apr/divide_widens_between_insurgent_groups_in_somalia
.aspx 
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international and regional efforts to create a power-sharing centralized national 
government have repeatedly failed to revive the state in Somalia. Only two of the 
thirteen failed national reconciliation conferences formed a transitional government: 
(1) the government of Djibouti with the help of Italy and Egypt among others held 
two conferences in June and July 1991 that resulted in the formation of the first 
transitional government led by Ali Mahdi Mohamed and (2) the government of 
Djibouti hosted another national reconciliation conference in 2000 that formed the 
Transitional National Government (TNG) led by Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, the 
predecessor the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The fourteenth conference 
resulted in the formation of TFG, but despite of international diplomatic, financial, 
and military support, it is unable to consolidate power.     
The power-sharing model allows for continued fighting among political 
entrepreneurs across Kingship Pyramid levels, and the model prevents the 
consolidation of power by creating a weak center (transitional government) with little 
ability to make policies and mechanisms to enforce them. Political entrepreneurs who 
feel that they did not get a high enough positions in the transitional government have 
continuously formed alliance of convenience to undermine power-sharing agreements 
and transitional governments that result from it (see figure 5). The idea of power-
sharing is that it allows antagonists to cooperate and gives all the major actors a stake 
in future government. Cooperation, however, is much different under anarchy. 
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According to Robert Axelrod (1984, 6), individual cooperate to “pursue their 
own self-interest without aid of central authority to force them to cooperate with each 
other.” Cooperation takes place under the shadow of the future; therefore, “…the use 
of reciprocity can be enough to make defection unproductive” (174). Axelrod‟s 
(1984) assertion that cooperation emerges under anarchy and leads to the formation of 
institutions has not held in the South Central Somalia example: cooperation between 
political entrepreneurs has been temporary, intended not to form institutions but to 
undermine them. Cooperation takes place when political entrepreneurs want to 
undermine power-sharing agreements during the reconciliation processes or after a 
transitional government is formed. In addition, cooperation is transient and breaks 
down when it achieves its purpose. Furthermore, defections in Somalia have not 
prevented future cooperation.  
As Kenneth Waltz argues in A Theory of International Relations, there is no 
cooperation under anarchy (1979). Intraclan anarchy resembles interstate anarchy 
“because [political entrepreneurs] coexist in a self-help system, they may, however, 
have to concern themselves not with maximizing collective gain [as power-sharing 
assumes] but with lessening, preserving, or widening the gap in welfare and strength 
between themselves and others. The contours of the future's shadow look different in 
hierarchic and anarchic systems. The shadow may facilitate cooperation in the 
former; it works against it in the latter. Worries about the future do not make 
cooperation and institution building among [political entrepreneurs] impossible; they 
do strongly condition their operation and limit their accomplishment” (Waltz 2000, 
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21).  Waltz‟s description of states in the international system of anarchy aptly 
captures the formation and reformation of alliances of convenience in South Central 
Somalia. 
ALLIANCE OF CONVENIENCE: HINDERING POWER-SHARING 
The alliance of convenience completes our three key components of the 
alliance framework; the first two being the interaction of private and political interests 
and center and periphery relations. Coalition building allowed USC/SSA and 
USC/SNA to expand territories under their control. The competition between the 
USC/SSA and USC/SNA to create local alliances ignited dormant conflicts and 
exacerbated existing conflicts in Baidoa, Kismayo, and Hiiraan, as discussed above. 
USC/SSA and USC/SNA provided military and financial support and legitimization 
to any local leader who challenged a dominant leader that their opponent supported. 
The result was the explosion of the number of factional leaders in South Central 
Somalia. Due to their dynamic interests, individual actors in both camps continuously 
changed sides; both camps were quick to welcome defectors from the opponent‟s 
side. The ease of defection allowed weaker actors to survive, preventing the process 
of state-making (Tilly 1980).  
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Explosion of Political Entrepreneurs in South Central Somalia 
 
Source: Hansen, Stig Jarle. "Civil War Economies, the Hunt for Profit and the 
Incentive for Peace: The Case of Somalia." The University of Bath, 2007: p 36, 
reproduced with permission from Dr. Hansen. 
 
In 1991, there were two major leaders in Mogadishu: the late General 
Mohamed Farah Aidid and his opponent Ali Mahdi Mohamed and by 2006 there 
were about a dozen political entrepreneurs in Mogadishu. In the larger South Central 
Somalia, there were a number of armed political entrepreneurs: General Mohamed 
Said Hersi Morgan, Colonel Mohamed Omar Jess, and Bare Adan Shire hiiraale, 
Yusuf Mohamed Said “Inda‟ade”, Hasan Mohamed Nur Shatigadud, just to mention 
few. 
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Alliances Transcends clan/subclan Identity 
Figure 5 – South Central Somalia: 1991-Present 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author  
Inter-subclan alliance building is more common than intra-subclan alliance 
building. This is the result of the interaction between private and communal interests, 
and periphery and center interplay. Alliances of convenience have been formed 
after/during reconciliation conferences. The purposes of these alliances have been to 
undermine power-sharing agreements before they materialize, as happened in 1997 
Cairo Conference, among others and to undermine if a transitional government is 
formed as happened after the formation of Transitional National Government (TNG).  
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Figure 6 – Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author  
SSRC (2001-2004) 
USC/SSA and USC/SNA were the first alliances of convenience in South 
Central Somalia. In keeping with this tradition, political entrepreneurs have formed a 
number of alliances of convenience. One such alliance was the Somali Reconciliation 
and Restoration Council (SSRC). After the Transitional National Government (TNG), 
which was backed by the Arab states, financially and diplomatically was established 
in (Arte Djibouti, 2000-2004); most of the major political entrepreneurs who were 
excluded opposed it even before the TNG reconciliation process was complete. Major 
political entrepreneurs – Hussein Aidid, Said Hersi Morgan, Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed, 
Hassan Mohamed Nur Shatigadud, and Muse Sudi Yallahow, among others – backed 
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by Ethiopia – created another alliance of convenience: the Somali Reconciliation and 
Restoration Council (SRRC).
41
  
SSRC leaders‟ only agreement was to topple the Transitional National 
Government (Menkhaus 2007). Each warlord had his own private interest while all 
claimed they wanted to safeguard their “subclans” interests and that of the nation. For 
example TNG and SSRC met in Nakuru, Kenya in 2002 and “agreed to the 
establishment of "an all-inclusive government" to ensure equitable power-sharing 
among all Somali clans” (IRIN, November 27, 2002). Political entrepreneurs also 
opposed it for personal reasons. Hussein Aidid opposed the TNG because it was 
dominated by Ayr, a subclan of Habargidir, replacing his Sa‟ad subclan who hitherto 
dominated Habargidir politics. Hussein Aidid said, “We knew how the Somali 
problem could be solved, because we had been the leaders on the ground for the last 
10 years. We were the ones who had participated or really understood the problem, or 
solutions, ever since UNOSOM left.”42 Aideed and his allies also mistrusted TNG‟s 
leadership for the preferential treatment it gave to some of its business supporters, 
                                                          
41
 An interesting fact about SSRC alliance that drives home the point of convenient alliances is the 
composition of SSRC. Two of SSRC leaders, Hussein Aidid and Shatigadud, fought fierce 
battles in the control for Bay and Bakool region as discussed above. Yet the bad blood 
between them did not prevent their union. Another leader was Mohamed Omar Habeb 
(Dhere), the current Mogadishu Mayor and Governor of Benadir region. See figure 3 above. 
For further discussion on Shatigadud stand before joining SSRC see his interview with IRIN 
http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=54&ReportId=72094&country=yes.  
 
 
42
 See the full interview with IRIN at  
http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=54&ReportId=72076&country=yes. 
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such as when it shared 15 million dollars with them that it had received from Saudi 
Arabia (Sage 2002, 137). Hasan Mohamed Nur Shatigadud initially opposed to the 
creation of SSRC because he was on the TNG side; however, after he lost a bit to 
become the Speaker of the Parliament, he joined SSRC. SSRC leaders supported 
Ethiopia‟s bid to form transitional government. The Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) with Ethiopia in the lead called for a national reconciliation 
conference in Eldoret, Kenya, but was later moved to Mbghati, Kenya. The 
reconciliation process lasted for two years and October 2004 Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed 
was selected President. The political entrepreneurs who felt that they did not high 
positions formed another alliance of convenience, which we turn to next.    
MSSP (2005-2006) 
After “armed ministers”, Mogadishu-based political entrepreneurs, left the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), they formed alliance, Security and 
Stabilization Plan (MSSP). Some these political entrepreneurs, for example, Muse 
Sudi Yallahow, were members of SSRC that helped to bring down the TNG and form 
TFG. Now MSSP group were seeking to bring down the TFG. The MSSP also 
included some Islamists who opposed the TFG. As the TFG weakened (2005-2006), 
writes professor Menkhaus (2007, 367), the MSSP alliance broke down as the result 
of a power struggle among its members, and Islamists and political entrepreneurs 
faced off.  
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ARPCT (February-June 2006) 
Some of the political entrepreneurs in Mogadishu formed the Alliance for the 
Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, (ARPCT). It is reported that the United 
States covertly supported ARPCT, which was supposed to balance power against 
emerging Islamic courts.
43
 These courts were initially formed along subclan lines, and 
they provided security within subclan and some social services. The courts gradually 
challenged the power of Mogadishu political entrepreneurs who cantonized the city 
into small fiefdoms.  The rift between the political entrepreneurs and Islamist reached 
its apex during the summer of 2006 when the Islamists created the Islamic Courts 
Union (Menkhaus 2007, 369).  
ICU (Summer-December 2006) 
In the summer of 2006, the Islamic Court Union (ICU) surprisingly defeated 
ARPCT. The political entrepreneurs who formed ARPCT controlled small fiefdoms 
in Mogadishu from 1991-2006. ARPCT leadership went into exile in their subclan 
territories in the rural areas outside of Mogadishu. Initially, the TFG welcomed the 
defeat of APRCT alliance and hailed the ICU. The ICU began to expand and capture 
town after town in South Central Somalia. For the first time, since the collapse of the 
military regime, South Central Somalia was under the control of a dominant group, 
the ICU.  The ICU leadership brought security, opened Mogadishu airport and sea-
port, removed all road blocks and stabilize South Central Somalia, all tasks that 
previous power-sharing failed to achieve.  
                                                          
43
 See John Prendergast‟s piece on the Washington Post, accessed through 
 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4164&l=1 
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Internal struggle within ICU moderate and hard-line wings led to the victory 
for the hardliners in formation of administration. While the ICU won victory inside 
Somalia, they failed to ally the fears of international and regional actors, the U.S. and 
Ethiopia being the most concerned about ICU‟s dominance in South Central Somalia 
and feared that ICU might establish an Islamic state in Somalia. In addition, the ICU 
and the TFG after several meetings in Yemen and Sudan failed to reach a political 
deal. The political impasse between the TFG and ICU, belligerent rhetoric between 
ICU and TFG leaders, and the fear of TFG that ICU will run over TFG, which was 
isolated in Baidoa, southern Somali town, led to TFG‟s invitation of Ethiopian troops. 
Ethiopian troops defeated ICU militia, and TFG leadership including President, 
Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed, finally arrive Mogadishu.  
ARS (2007-present) 
Remnants of ICU, members of parliament who either left TFG or were sacked 
from formed the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). ARS and TFG have 
made several failed attempts to reach political agreement. Therefore, conflict rages in 
Mogadishu between TFG and ARS. Although the result of TFG and ARS struggle is 
beyond this thesis, based on the history of alliances of convenience in Somalia, it 
could be expected  that if ARS topples the TFG, the ARS alliance will cease to exist 
and another competition will ensue. On the other hand, if TFG is able to withstand 
ARS and survive,  a split within TFG is a high probability, as was the case between 
President Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed and his former Prime Minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi 
who was ousted as result of  a rift between the two men. Their struggle almost ended 
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the prospect of TFG. Another struggle with in the TFG is not far fudged as Yusuf and 
his current Prime Minister, Nur Hassan Hussein "Nur Adde" differ in how to pursuit 
negations with the ARS.   
The alternative to power-sharing and alliance of convenience is the emergence 
of a dominant group. This line of thinking may not satisfy those who fear another 
dictator; however, evidence from Somalia and elsewhere suggests that consolidation 
of power by one group has been the key to stability and institutionalization.  
 
THE DOMINANT GROUP MODEL 
The past power-sharing agreements and transitional governments that were 
formed to create a Somali state have failed. First, power-sharing assumes that conflict 
is among clans, and it is not. Second, power-sharing assumes that political 
entrepreneurs cooperate to for collective gain, but cooperation under anarchy is 
transient, and its intention is to ensure relative gain vis-à-vis other actors. Finally 
power-sharing assumes that all actors can be given a stake in the process, but Somali 
experience illustrates that there are always losers, and they form alliances of 
conveniences to ensure that their relative bargaining power is intact.  
While exogenous attempts to form power-sharing agreements have failed, 
endogenous attempts to consolidate power have succeeded. For example, the two 
stable regions of contemporary Somalia – Puntland, in the northwest, and Somaliland, 
in the north, – achieved stability without any power-sharing agreements. In 
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Somaliland late President Mohammed Ibrahim Igal and former Prime Minister of the 
Somali Republic (1967-1969) defeated his predecessor and former Somali National 
Movement Chairman Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuor. Similarly, in Puntland Abdulahi 
Yusuf Ahmed, the current Transitional Federal Government President and former 
Puntland regional President defeated General Mohamed Abshir, former chief of 
Somali police academy and long time politician. The success of Puntland and 
Somaliland as self-governing territories within what was the Somali Republic 
indicates the emergence of a dominant group was the key to their stability.  
It is equally important that the only time period when South Central Somalia 
was stable since 1991 was the six months between June and December 2006 when a 
dominant group, the Islamic Court Union (ICU), ruled South Central Somalia. The 
ICU consolidated power by defeating their opponents on the battle ground.  The ICU 
also brought a level of certainty and a sense of stability to the region within a short 
period of time. The battle ground victories gave ICU legitimacy and most Somalis, 
regardless of clan, accepted them. On the other hand, the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) failed to win legitimacy because most Somalis consider that the 
TFG won victory with their “virtue”, to use Machiavelli‟s term.44 Rather, the TFG is 
seen as a puppet of Ethiopia and the United States.   
The dominant group model has been vital to consolidating power and 
stabilizing conflict prone countries like Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, and Sierra Leone 
                                                          
44
 Niccolo Machiavelli defines virtue as strength and skills. See Wootton, David, ed. Niccolo 
 Machiavelli: Selected Political Writings. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc,  
1994.    
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(without side military support), just to mention but four countries. In each, one group 
neutralized or eliminated their enemies, and then they co-opted some of them in their 
administrations. In Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland, and South Central under the brief 
reign of the Islamic Court Union, fit in the dominant model. Future research will 
show that dominant group model is more conducive to getting countries out of 
conflict trap than power-sharing model that has been prominent hitherto. 
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CONCLUSION 
The power-sharing model and alliance of convenience, which reinforce each 
other, have hindered the prospects for Somalia to get out of the conflict trap. The 
solution for Somalia lies in the emergence of a dominant group. 
 Although traditional norms (informal rules) survived the colonial powers, 
military dictatorship, and anarchy in Somalia, they lacked the robustness needed to 
mediate the multiple protracted conflicts in Somalia. Their utility was largely limited 
to mediating apolitical conflicts within the (“diya-paying”) group.  
The international and regional attempts to created power-sharing, inclusive 
government has led to formation of transitional vampire governments. The 
ramifications of these transitional governments have been ever more intensive power 
struggle to capture transitional governments and extract rents.  
Hence, Somali conflicts in South Central region are not clan conflicts; clans 
are only (tools). The drivers of the conflicts are power (means), and resources and 
territory (an end goal).  It is apt to argue that politics is a means of securing economic 
opportunities for one‟s self and his kin (KP2, i.e., extended families). Since the 
conflict in South Central Somalia is not between clans, no power-sharing agreement 
will mollify the fear of those who perceive that they have been excluded from the 
levers of a future state.  Politics are a “zero-sum game”, and no power-sharing 
scheme is enough to satisfy all the major political entrepreneurs who are concerned 
not with collective but relative individual gains.  
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Finally, when we examine conflict in South Central Somalia, we discover that 
power-sharing agreements have failed because losers form alliance of convenience to 
undermine them. First, alliance building across the kinship pyramid prolongs war 
because it delays the “ripening” of the war.45 Contrary to the general explanation that 
Somali‟s conflict is a clan conflict, the alliances in USC/SSA, USC/SNA, SRRC, 
MSSP, ARPCT, ICU, and ARS derived their support across the kinship pyramid. 
Each group was a reshuffling of former enemies who conveniently allied only to 
backstab each other later. The continuous defections in South Central Somalia helped 
the weaker actors and delayed the completion of state-making processes.  
Second, alliance formation and re-formation was intense not because of clan 
or religion but because of the private interests of political entrepreneurs, symbiotic 
relations between political entrepreneurs and their support base, and periphery and 
center interplay.  
Third, South Central conflict has been protracted because of failure of any 
dominant group to emerge and secure power in the region. The interplay between 
periphery and center further contributes to the protraction of the conflict. The gap in 
research thus far has been the lack of micro-level analysis – analysis identity, actors, 
and interests and lack of any discussion about the role of dominant group. This thesis 
fills this gap and illustrates that the alliance framework that Kalyvas (2003) proposed 
                                                          
45
 William Zartman cited in Keller J and M. Spear "Conflict Resolution in Africa: Insights from Un 
Representatives and U.S. Government Officials." Africa Today 43 (1996): 121-39. 
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explains the protraction in South Central Somali conflict. The alliance framework 
illustrates how political entrepreneurs undermine power-sharing arrangements. 
Moreover, the evidence in Somalia suggest that the power-sharing model that has 
been applied to Somalia since the independence has not led to stability and 
development of institutions while tentative evidence suggest the dominant leader 
model helped Somaliland and Puntland to become stabile and began 
institutionalization processes. Future research will evidence that the dominant group 
model is the key path from anarchy to stability and institutionalization both of which 
are key to long term political and economic development.  
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Appendix 
Conflict Mapping 
Region 
 
Main Social  
Groups/Clans 
Resources Conflicts and disputes  
 
Banadir 
 
 
- Metropolitan city, 
mixed Somalis ( 
clans and sub-
clans)) Hawiye: 
Abgal, Murusade, 
Reer Xamar, 
Habargidir, Jareer 
(Bantu) and 
Darod, Dir etc. 
(The Abgal, 
Murusade and 
Reer Hamar 
claim they are the 
predominant 
clans). 
- National Public 
Institutions i.e. 
seaport, airport 
etc. 
- Major 
commercial 
enterprises i.e. 
real estate 
- property 
ownership 
- Control of the 
capital city 
- Access to public 
facilities 
- Political and land 
dispute: 
occupation of 
non-Hawiye real 
estate 
 
Lower 
Shabeelle 
 
- Digil: Geledi, 
Begedi, Tunni, 
Jiddo, Garre, 
Shanta-alen. 
- Hawiye: 
Murusade, Abgal, 
Wa‟dan, 
Wadallan, 
Habargidir 
- Dir: Biyomaal 
- Reer Xamar, 
Jareer (Bantu) 
- Agriculture 
fertile lands: 
Banana, Maize, 
Sugar-cane, 
horticulture etc. 
- rich grazing 
lands and 
shabelle river 
- State-owned 
plantation 
- Foreign owned 
plantation i.e. 
Italian, Libyan, 
UAE 
- Private owned 
plantation 
- Livestock: 
Cattle, Camel 
and Goats & 
Sheep. 
- Property & Land 
dispute 
- Forceful 
occupation of 
public/private 
property 
- Political control: 
pastoral versus 
indigenous 
- Sharia Islam 
versus secular 
- Access to water 
resources 
- Forced labour 
 
Middle 
Juba 
 
- Jareer (Bantu) 
- Hawiye: 
Sheikhal 
- Darod: Ogaadeen 
- Digil: Garre and 
Tunni 
- Gibil-ad 
- Makanne 
- Dir 
- Agriculture: 
Mango, Grape 
fruits, Maize, 
Sorghum, sugar-
cane 
- Livestock: 
Camel, Cattle, 
Goats & Sheep 
- State-owned 
- Land & Property 
dispute 
- Deforestation 
(charcoal) 
- Appropriation of 
private property 
- Access to the Juba 
river (water 
resources) 
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property (major 
development 
projects) 
- Political control: 
Hawiye versus 
Daarood 
 
Lower Juba 
 
- Daarood: Harti 
and Ogaadeen 
- Hawiye: Gaal-
jecel, Sheikhal, 
Giirgiir, Wardaay 
- Baajuun, Gibil-
ad, Jareer  
- Agriculture & 
livestock 
- State-owned 
property (major 
development 
projects) 
- Seaport and 
airport 
- Water (Sea and 
River) 
- Appropriation of 
private property 
- Political control: 
Land, property 
and leadership 
(Hawiye versus 
Daarood, Hawiye 
versus Hawiye 
and Daarood 
versus Daarood, 
Minorities versus 
the rest) 
- Water resources 
 
 
 
Gedo 
 
- Mirifle/Digil; Daarood: 
Ogaadeen and Mareexaan; 
Dir: Gaadsan; Others: 
Dagodi and Ajuuraan, 
Gibil-ad  
- Agriculture & Livestock 
- Juba river 
- State-owned property 
(development projects) 
- Political control: 
leadership, Raxan Weyn 
versus Daarood, Daarood 
versus Daarood and 
Minorities versus the rest 
- Water resources 
- Islamic movements  
Bay  
 
 
- Mirifle/Digil 
- Gibil-ad 
- Daarood: 
Ogaadeen & 
Mareexaan 
- Livestock and 
Agriculture 
- State owned 
development 
projects 
- Land & Property 
dispute 
- Severe water 
shortage 
- Political 
leadership: Mirifle 
versus Mirifle, 
Daarood versus 
Mirifle and 
Mirifle versus 
Hawiye 
 
 
Bakool 
- Mirifle 
- Minorities: Gibil-
ad 
- Daarood: 
Ogaadeen 
- Livestock and 
Agriculture 
- Land & Property dispute 
- Severe water shortage 
- Political control: 
leadership contest between 
Mirifle 
 
 
- Hawiye: Abgaal, 
Gaaljecel and 
Xawaadle 
- Makanne and 
- Agriculture & 
Livestock 
- Shabeelle river 
- State owned 
- Land & Property 
dispute 
- Political 
leadership: 
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Middle 
Shabeelle 
Reer Shabeelle 
- Minorities: Gibil-
ad 
development 
projects 
Abgaal versus 
Abgaal, Abgaal 
versus the rest 
- Water resources 
 
 
Hiiraan 
- Hawiye: 
Xawaadle, 
Gaaljecel, Jajelle, 
Jiidle, Ujeejeen, 
Habargidir, 
Murusade, 
Abgaal 
- Minorities: 
Jareer , Shiidle, 
Gibil-ad 
- Agriculture & 
Livestock 
- Water resources 
(Shabeele river) 
 
- Access to water 
- Political 
leadership: 
Contest between 
Hawiye, mainly 
Xawaadle versus 
the rest 
- Land & Property 
dispute 
 
 
Galgaduud 
- Hawiye: 
Habargidir 
(Cayr, 
Solaymaan & 
Saruur), abgaal, 
Murusade and 
duduble 
- Daarood: 
Mareexaan 
- Dir 
- Minorities: 
Midgaan 
- Livestock 
- Fishing 
- Access to water 
- Severe shortage of water 
- Land dispute between Dir 
and Mareexaan 
South 
Mudug 
 
 
- Hawiye: 
Habargidir 
(Sacad, Saruur 
and Solaymaan) 
and Abgaal 
- Dir 
- Sheikhaal 
- Livestock 
- Fishing 
- Political 
leadership: 
Between Sacad 
and Daarood 
Harti, Dir versus 
Sacad) 
- Water resources 
(severe shortage)   
 
“Note: The two terms of water shortage and access to water resources are not 
interchangeable terms. Water shortage means: Galgudud and Mudug regions there is 
shortage of water whereas in Lower Shabelle and the Juba regions, there is water but 
access to it is very difficult and it often causes conflict.” Adapted by author from 
CRD 2004. 
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